A comparative case study of private investment and economic development in Ethiopia and Tanzania, 1986-1996, 2000 by Woldemariam, Kasahun Reta (Author) et al.
ABSTRACT
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND DEVELOPMENT
WOLDEMARIAM, KASAHUNR. B. S. BUFFALO STATE COLLEGE, 1995
A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA AND TANZANIA. 1986-1996
Advisor: Ciyata Coleman, Ph. D
Thesis dated July 2000
This study examined the contribution of foreign direct investment to economic
development in Ethiopia and Tanzania from 1986 to 1996. Data for this study were obtained
from the Ethiopian Investment Authority in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and the Tanzanian
Investment Promotion Centre in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Other publications including the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations Human Development
Programme were also consulted.
Using exploratory research method, this undertaking compared and contrasted foreign
investment flows and the conditions under which the transfer of capital and technology help
achieve the development objectives of the two countries. It also analyzed the investment
policies and the role of the state in the transformation of the economies ofEthiopia and
Tanzania.
The results of the study suggest that the expectation that foreign technology and
capital are necessary to transform the economies ofEthiopia and Tanzania is not fully
confirmed. Moreover, the results of the study suggest that the investment policies were not
reflective of the countries’ unique economic conditions. Additionally, the transformation of
these economies from underdevelopment to development may be enhanced by strengthening
the capacity of the state to build the human capital stock, provide reliable communication
systems, and regulate anti-competitive practices.
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This study is about the two “economies in transition” in Africa: Ethiopia and
Tanzania. It explores the development models, central planning and free-market
economy, that have been adapted by the two countries. In addition, this undertaking
examines the role of the state and foreign private capital in the transformation of the
economies of Tanzania and Ethiopia. It also compares and contrasts the investment
policies of Tanzania and Ethiopia.
The paper is divided into four chapter& The introduction chapter includes
background, purpose and importance ofthe study, research questions, hypotheses,
definitions, and limitations of the study. Chapter II is devoted to literature review with
particular focus on the role of the state and the development policies pursued by Tanzania
and Ethiopia. This Chapter also examines the extent to which the flow of foreign capital
and technology contributes to economic growth in Ethiopia and Tanzania and whether or
not the transfer of technology closes the digital gap. In Chapter III, the investment
policies ofEthiopia and Tanzania are analyzed. In Chapter IV, some concluding remarks
are made.
A. Perspectives on the Sources of Underdevelopment in Africa
There are mainly two schools of thought with opposing views regarding the
sources of underdevelopment in Africa. One school of thought holds that colonialism has
disrupted social, economic, and political transformations in Africa. Shortages of capital
and technological backwardness that is pervasive in Africa are, therefore, results of
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imperial intrusion.’ The other popular view regarding the sources of underdevelopment
holds that internal factors are largely to blame for the current social, economic, and
political disarrays in Africa.2
How the imperial powers and Africans perceived their natural environment was
an important factor that led to the colonization ofAfrica. For Africans, nature and
mankind co-existed in harmony. Any change or disturbance to nature would cause
imbalance and disharmony. For Western nations, nature was to serve manicind.
Obstacles for growth and advancement were only temporary and would eventually be
under control.
The differences in the perceptions of the natural environment have been
manifested in actions, inventions, and innovations. As Michael Adas observed, “Africans
built roads that twisted and turned around trees rather than cutting a straight path.”3
Europeans, on the other hand, attempted to master the laws of nature and challenged the
limits of space and time. They built canals, warships, railways, and airplanes to
transcend the boundaries of their immediate natural environment Adas also noted:
the assumption that it was desirable for humans to master nature and
that the scientifically minded and innovative Europeans were best at doing
so led many authors to the conviction that it was the destiny and duty of the
Europeans to extend into and develop regions occupied. . . [by] half-child,
half-human [but] wholly savages.4
‘For fl.irther infonnation, see Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington,
DC: Howard University Press, 1982).
2~c Yoweri Museveni, quetoed in Johanna McGeary, “An Affican For Africa,”~ (1
September 1997): 36-40. See also, Tanganyika African National Union, The Arusha Declaration and
TANU’s Policy on Socialism and Self-reliance (Dar-es-Salaam: NTJTA Press Ltd., 1967): 4-5.
3Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure ofMen: Science. Technology, and Ideologies of
Western Dominance (New York: Cornel University Press, 1989), 217.
4lbid.
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Some took a counter-position to the convictions stated above and argued that the mission
of the West in Africa was driven by pure economic interests including the exploitation of
natural and human resources and the search for market outlets for their surplus capital.
Rosa Luxemburg argued that “[ejapitalism needs non-capitalist social strata as a market
for its surplus value, as a source of supply for its means ofproduction and as a reservoir
of labour power for its wage system.”5
Raymond Betts stated that with European exploration into the hinterland of
Africa, “[tjhe Dark Continent, it would appear, was suddenly suffused with light”6 The
actions, inventions, and rationality, or binding to the laws of nature and its ruthlessness
perpetuated the gap in capital accumulation and technological advancement between the
West and the colonies in Africa.
The West is technologically advanced with enormous surplus capital. The Third
World lacks technology and capital to transform its economies from underdevelopment to
development. Bernice Scott also argued that “Europeans, by virtue of greed. . . and
economic necessity, had ventured across the sea, and for almost one hundred years, had
been exploiting the human and natural resources ofAfrica,”7 In addition, as Paul Baran
maintained, the search for market outlets and natural and human resources manifested in
5Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation ofCapital (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), 368;
translated by Agnes Schwarzchild.
6Raymond F. Bctts, The Scramble for Africa: Causes and Dimensions ofEmpire, 2nd edition.
(Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972), vii.
7Bernice DeGannes Scott, “Arrested Development: The Economic Legacy ofEuropean
Expansionism and Colonialism in the Caribbean,” The Western Journal ofBlack Studies, 19,3, (1995):
197.
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the disruption ofdomestic capital accumulation and indigenous technological
advancements in Africa. The economic motives of the colonial powers forced Africans
to produce exportable crops.8 The present economic crisis in Africa, according to Baran,
is attributable to the workings of the colonial powers “that were nothing but self-seeking
and engaged in activities that were nothing but predatory.”9
The late Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, delivering the Tanganyika. African National
Union Creed -- the Arusha Declaration -- noted that it was internal weaknesses that
brought external forces of underdevelopment. For Nyerere, the internal weaknesses have
contributed to colonial subjugation which, in turn, resulted in the disruption of economic
activities and technological advancements in Africa. He stated: “[ut is our weakness that
has led to our being oppressed, exploited and disregarded. We now intend to bring about
a revolution which will ensure that we are never again victims of these things.”°
The revolution, however, “was symbolic rather than real, as it involved the
replacement of white rulers by black ones without a significant improvement in the well
being of the people” which made it difficult to identif~y adversaries from allies.11 Some
maintained that Africa’s decadence has been engendered by the transformation of
8Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy ofGrowth (New York, Monthly Review Inc., 1968), 143.
9thid, 142.
‘°Tanganyika African National Union, The Arusha Declaration and TANU’s Policy on Socialism
and Self-reliance (Dar-es-Salaan~i: NUTA Press Ltd., 1967): 4-5.
1tCoelestin R. S. Muzo, “Party Leadership and Socialist Transformation: A Case Study ofNyakota
TANU Branch in Bukoba District,” in C. R S. Muso, H. J. Mosa, M. K Misanga, U. Kabuka,, C. T. Nduru,
and Helge Kjekshus, The Party Essays on TANU (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House, 1976), 1.
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political power into the hands of “conceptually incarcerated”2 evolves (as has been
applied to scholars working in the Euro-centric tradition) that “identify more with
powerful interests in the core and less with the people of their own countries.”3 The
colonial powers, according to Arthur Gavashon,
put away their nineteenth-century presumptions [and] that direct
political control was needed to preserve access to the resources and
markets of their colonial territories... [for] they had groomed heirs to
take over, heirs ready and willing to settle for the shadow rather than
the substance of true independence.’4
Furthermore, David Birmingham observed that post-independence leaders are mirror
images of colonial rulers, governing by force and fiat and taking their subjects further
away from prosperity.’5 Jean=Francois Bayart also asserted:
Africans are not passive victims of external forces. . . . They are always
engaged in the process of ‘extroversion,’ in which they have sought to
draw on resources or alliances available in the external environment in
furtherance of their continuing internal competitions and conflicts. 16
Evidently, Bayart was referring to African leaders as perpetuating economic
underdevelopment in the region. For the president of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni,
however, Africa’s economic underdevelopment is attributable to cultural backwardness
and political divisions along ethnic lines. He stated that the solution for Africa is to
‘2Wade Nobles, quoted in N&im Akbar, “Afrocentric Social Sciences for Human Liberation,”
Journal ofBlack Studies 14,4(1984): 396.
‘3Marian A. L., Miller, The Third World in Global Environmental Politics (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1995), 21.
t4See Arthur Gavshon, Crisis in Africa: Battleground of East and West (New York: Penguin
Books, 1981).
‘5David Birmingham, The Decolonization of Africa (Athens: Ohio State University, 1995), 2.
‘6See Jean-Francois Bayart, quoted in Arthur Oavshon, Crisis in Africa: Battleground of East and
~ (New Yo± Penguin Books, 1981).
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create a United States ofAfrica, suppress the rise ofcompetitive political parties, and find
ways for Africans to become “Asianized.”7
From this introductory discussion, it can be inferred that the social, economic, and
political underdevelopment in many parts ofAfrica was caused by internal and external
factors. At the national level, the development strategies ofAfrican countries were either
too ambitious or lacked strategic vision. The development policies pursued by African
governments had to take into account the international environment as well.
B. Background on Ethiopia and Tanzania
The two countries were governed by socialist regimes (Ethiopia from 1974 until
1991 and Tanzania from 1964 until 1985). Ethiopia is among the few countries in the
world that successfully, for the most part, challenged European colonial incursion during
the Scramble for Africa and the First and Second World Wars. From early October 1935
until January 1941, Ethiopia was occupied by the Italian forces that were mainly
restricted in the provincial capital cities ofcentral and northern Ethiopia. Given the short
period of Italian occupation ofEthiopia and the persistent clashes between Ethiopian and
Italian forces, it is difficult to claim that Ethiopia was under colonial subjugation.
From 1942 until 1974, Ethiopia was ruled by Emperor Haile Selassie. During
this period, Ethiopia was a politically, socially, and economically stable country with a
few exceptions dealing with Ethio.-Eritrean integration and the Ethio-Somali border
conflicts. To say that Ethiopia under Emperor Haile Selassie was politically, socially,
and economically stable is not to suggest that the country was progressing towards
development. In the early 1970s, Ethiopia was faced with one of the worst droughts in its
history in which thousands of people died ofstarvation. Lack of response by the central
‘7Keith B. Richburg, Out ofAmerica: A Black Man Confronts Africa, (New York: Basic Books,
1997), 176. See also, Johanna McGeary, “An African For Africa,” Ijrne (1 September 1997): 36-40.
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government to the starvation in northern Ethiopia precipitated violent demonstrations in
the provincial cities of Gonder, Gojam, Addis Ababa, and in other parts of Ethiopia..
Consequently, in February 1974, the armed forces overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie and
remained in power until August 1991.
The colonial experience of Tanzania is, to a large extent, different from Ethiopia.
Tanzania was colonized by Germany from 1885 until 1919. From 1919 until 1961,
Tauganyika was under British “protectorate.” In 1964, Zanzibar became integrated with
mainland Tanganyika to form the United Republic of Tanzania. Unlike the federal
arrangement ofEritre&s integration with Ethiopia, the integration ofZanzibar with
Tanganyika was designed to provide partial autonomy to Zanzibar and to ensure
the separation ofpolitical power between mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar. To that end,
the president ofZanzibar is the vice president of the United Republic of Tanzania. Three
years after the formation of the United Republic of Tanzania, the Arusha Declaration was
passed. It established a socialist development program and nationalized domestic and
foreign properties. Like the government of Tanzania, the military government of
Ethiopia declared socialism as the country’s development path and nationalized domestic
and foreign private properties.
The development objectives ofboth governments were to promote collective
social and political consciousness and to foster self-reliance and industrialization
anchored on collective farming (Ujamaa villages in Tanzania and Sefera in Ethiopia).
Private properties were nationalized and policies for universal access to education, health,
and other social services were enacted. Ethiopia and Tanzania made great strides in
providing universal access but achieved neither industrialization nor food security.
The declining rate of food production in both countries was partly caused by the
drought in Ethiopia in the early 1970s and in Tanzania in the mid-1970s, and partly by
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the absence of fanning techniques that are envimnmentally sound. This was exacerbated
by the diversion of scarce financial resources from investments in the rural and urban
economic sectors to the purchase of arms. For example, in 1986, the military
expenditures for Ethiopia and Tanzania as percentages of Gross National Product were
8.6% and 3.3%, respectively. In other words, in 1986 the military government of
Ethiopia spent over a billion dollars and the government of Tanzania spent $110 million
for the purchase of arms.’8
The oil-shocks of 1973 and 1979 were also other compounding factors for
economic decline in Ethiopia and Tanzania. When the two countries were scorched by
drought, Middle Eastern and North African oil-rich countries decided to increase their
prices. The second oil-price increase occurred when the government ofEthiopia was
confronted by secessionist and irredentist groups including the Eritrean and the Oromo
Liberation Fronts and the Somalia government. Tanzania had to fight a war against the
government of IdA Amin Dada ofUganda whose human rights violations forced many to
seek refuge in Tanzania and other neighboring countries.
These internal and external factors profoundly affected savings, investments, and
domestic capital formations that are crucial for economic growth. The development
policies pursued by both countries, particularly the nationalization ofdomestic and
foreign private properties, were evidently designed to undermine the rise of bourgeois
classes. Policy-makers in Ethiopia and Tanzania took the view that central or command
economic systems meant not only putting up barriers to foreign private sectors but to
domestic private sectors as well. Both, in their view, had the same capitalist motive —
exploiting the working class.
‘8lnternational Monetary Fund, “Unproductive Public Expenditures: A Pragmatic Approach to
Policy Analysis,” Pamphlet Series No. 48 (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1995): 8.
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Beginning in the late 1 980s, the governments of Tanzania and Ethiopia took the
view that capital is a necessary precondition for economic growth. As a result, Ethiopia
and Tanzania adopted a free-market economic policy and created the condition for
domestic and foreign private sector participation in their economies. However, given the
weaknesses of the domestic private sectors in both countries, the adoption ofa free-
market economy by the two countries has become as much contested as their previous
development model.
Statement of the Problem
A report by the United Nations Conference on Trade And Development
(UNCTAD) pointed out that “African nations are still faced with a number ofobstacles
that are impeding industrial expansion.”’9 The report further stated that “[t]he way to
accelerate industrialization is to actively encourage foreign direct investment
programmes.”2° The former United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew
Young, supported the views expressed by UNCTAD.
Mindful of the shortages ofcapital and technology in many parts of Africa
including our countries of focus, Young stated that foreign investment is the only means
to tackle economic crisis in Africa.2’ A Tanzanian representative, speaking on behalf of
the Group of 77, said that the “emphasis on private capital flows was a fallacious
argument, since very little of such flows was going to the countries that needed them
‘9United Nations Con~mission On Trade And Development, Annual Meeting of the Trade and
Development Board. UNCATD News 1997 Year in Review (New York: United Nations, 1997), 1.
2°Ibid.
21Andrew Young, speech delivered at the National Summit on Africa (Georgia: 9May 1998).
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most.”22 His statement presupposes the importance of capital for economic development
and the opening up ofmarkets of the developing countries for foreign investment. In the
views of Friedrich List, however, economic liberalization “would enable the strongest
nations to dominate the trade and industry of weaker countries and reduce them to a
condition of slavery.”23 Even if the preconditions are met and foreign capital
and technology transfer takes place, some observers and policy-makers are not convinced
about the benefits of free-market economy to underdeveloped countries. Two prominent
leaders, Prime Minster Mahathir Mohammed ofMalaysia and the late Mwalimu Julius
Nyerere of Tanzama, were not optimistic about the free-market economy as a suitable
model for developing countries. At the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum,
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed stated:
The creed of the market is to surrender your independence to those who
know best and you will prosper.. . . Thus the swing from the government
knows all.. . to the market can do no wrong. . . is now as extreme as
communism and socialism ofyesteryear.24
Indeed, the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and twenty-two religious and
secular organizations went as far as to issue a statement calling on the leaders of the
Group of Seven (Denver Summit) to “consult with Africans before making policy
decisions which affect African nations.” While praising the efforts of the Group of Seven
for paying particular attention to Africa, the CBC and the religious and secular groups
22~~j~ Nations Sustainable Development Commission, “Lack ofFinancial Aid Will Kill Dream
of Sustainable Development in Developing Countries,” United Nations Press Release, ENV/DEV/409
(New York: United Nations, 8 April 1997).
23Friedrich List, The Natural System ofPolitical Economy (New Jersey: Frank Cass and Company
Limited, 1983), 25; translated and edited by W. 0. Henderson.
24Mahathir Mohammed, speech delivered at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum
(Vancouver: Canada, November 1997).
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expressed their concern that the “Denver Summit ofEight [may] become a modem-day
Berlin Conference.”25
Additionally, Mwalimu Nyerere, addressing delegates at the National Summit on
Africa in 1998, noted that foreign investment has to come in the same package with
respect for humanity and sovereignty.26 Given these statements by advocates and critics
of market economy, it is evident that there is a need for exploring the extent to which the
inflows of capital and technology accelerate the economies of Ethiopia and Tanzania.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the study is to examine the role of the state and foreign private
investment in the economic transformation of Tanzania and Ethiopia. The transfer of
capital and technology into the economies of Tanzania and Ethiopia is subject to
the development and investment policies formulated and implemented by the
governments ofeach country. Therefore, the research also compares and contrasts the
investment policies of the two countries and seeks to identify the factors that would
improve their chances of successful transition from underdevelopment to development.
The Importance of the Study
The importance of the study partly lies in its treatment ofEthiopia and Tanzania
as “economies in transition.” Tanzania (from 1967 to 1985) and Ethiopia (from 1974 to
1991) were ruled by socialist governments whereby the state dictated their economic and
political directions. The role of the state in central planning system included maintaining
a fixed exchange rate, determine the direction ofpublic investments, and set the price of
25Washington Office on Africa, “Africans Must Have Voice in Economic Policymaking,”
woa@igc.apc.org (11 June 1997).
26Julius Nyerere, speech delivered at the National Summit on Africa (Georgia: 9 May 1998).
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goods and services. Development policies were formulated and implemented to protect
the public sector through regulatory and discriminatory measures including tariffbarriers
and quotas.
Tanzania and Ethiopia, since the late 1980’s, have begun to liberalize their
economies. By adopting a free-market economy as their development model, the
development policies shifted from import substitution to export-oriented development
schemes. This shift in development strategy required drastic structural reforms if
Tanzania and Ethiopia were to compete effectively with other developing countries that
either experimented with a mixed or a central planning economic development approaek
Furthermore, bold reforms were undertaken to deregulate the market, limit the role of the
state in the management of the economy, and reduce and eliminate protective measures.
Public policies in both countries sought to establish credible and flexible
investment policy environments to attract foreign investments without weakening the
legitimate function of the state including protecting the poor, the environment, and
private properties. In addition, policy-makers in both countries attempted to ensure that
the investment policies and programs aimed not only to deliver economic growth but also
to redistribute the benefits ofmarket-led growth through investments in basic education
and health.27
Moreover, unlike other countries who have established global trade networks,
Tanzania and Ethiopia sought greater access to markets of not only the former socialist
countries but also capitalist countries of Western Europe and North America. Both
countries reformed their trade policies and placed emphasis on diversifying trading
27The World Bank, The State in a Changing World. World Development Report 1997 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1997), 4.
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partners rather than remaining content with their previous trade relations, which were
defined with ideological overtones.
A successful transformation of the economies ofEthiopia and Tanzania lies in
their abilities to diversify their commodities and access the extensive market outlets for
their products. These opportunities could be realized through the implementation of
development policies that are predictable and nondiscriminatory. Under the previous
regimes, public policies in Tanzania and Ethiopia were largely in favor of the public
sectors at the expense of the domestic private sectors. This development strategy was
unique to Tanzania and Ethiopia when compared with most other developing countries in
that the formulation and implementation of their public policies need to be highly flexible
and effective to reinvigorate the domestic private sectors.
Moreover, while the importance of the study partly lies in treating Tanzania and
Ethiopia as special cases, it also contributes to development discourse by identifying
some differences between the two countries’ investment and privatization policies.
As the United Nations study shows,
while it may be true that no two countries face identical difficulties in
their industrialization process, it is also true that countries at a similar
developmental stage face difficulties ofmuch the same kind and, being
subjected to much the same economic [as well as social and political]
forces, often find themselves in very similar situations.28
Research Questions
Thirty of the world’s forty-nine low-income economies are in sub-Saharan
Africa.29 Among the thirty countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Ethiopia is the second and
28United Nations, Processes and Problems of Industrialization ofUnder-developed Countries
(New York, United Nations, 1955), 6; quoted in Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy ofCkowth (New
York, Monthly Review Inc., 1968), 135.
29The World Bank, World Development Report 1997. The State in a Changing World, 214.
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Tanzania is the third poorest country in the world. In other words, Ethiopia and
Tanzania are the poorest of the poor in the world. Much energy and resources have been
expended to identify the factors that led to Africas declining rate of production and
consumption. Although there are inequalities among the poor countries of the world,
much of the research dealing with poverty alleviation, productivity, and consumption in
Africa assumes that the sources of and solution for economic underdevelopment are
universally applicable.
The investment policies of the two countries reflect competitive incentives for
foreign private investment in some sectors and designate other areas as “to be
determined” in the future or as exclusively reserved for public investment. These were
basically recognition of shortages ofdomestic capital and technology and the absence of
competitive indigenous private sectors in their economies.
Governments in both countries continued reformulating their investment policies
to attract foreign investment. The refonnulation of the investment policies were intended
to increase exports and supply of goods and services to their domestic markets, create
employment, and reduce production cost. The benefits of these policies to the foreign
private sectors included access to cheap labor, natural resources, tax holidays, and other
investment incentives as stipulated in the Investment Acts and Amendments ofTanzania
and Ethiopia. Given the challenges and opportunities facing Tanzania and Ethiopia, the
following question is raised:
Under what conditions do capital accumulation and technology transfer
enhance the development objectives of Tanzania and Ethiopia?
Hypotheses
The global economy is increasingly integrating, absorbing smaller nations into the
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larger world community under the auspices ofcapitalism. In capitalistic development,
competition among economic actors is crucial for successful transformation of the
economy. Competition leads to efficient utilization of resources and this is possible
when states play their proper role. The role of the state in the economic sphere is
diminishing, paving the way for the private sector to partake in the economic
development of the two countries. Based on a review of the literature with a particular
focus on foreign private investment, the role of the state, the investment and development
policies of Tanzania and Ethiopia, the following hypotheses are put forth:
1. The investment policies of Tanzania and Ethiopia are not consistent with
their development strategies.
2. Market size and national development policy alone do not determine the flow
of foreign direct investment.
Definition of Terms
Foreign direct investment refers to “investment abroad involving an element of
control by the investor over the corporation in which the investment is made.”3°
Dominick Salvatore defines foreign direct investment as investment in factories and
capital goods where “both capital and management are involved and the investor retains
control over, the use of the invested capital.”3’ Apparently, the definition of foreign direct
investment has expanded to include not only “some element of control” but also
“retaining control” over the use of invested capital. For the purpose of this study, foreign
direct investment refers to an investment abroad in which the investor not only retains
3~united Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, Salient Features and Trends in Foreign
Direct Investment, ST/CTC/14 (New York: United Nations, 1983), 1.
31Dominick Salvatore, international Economics. 5th edition, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall inc.,
1995), 368;
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control of the invested capital but also has a significant influence on the rate of savings,
investment, and domestic capital formatiott As the definition of foreign direct
investment varied concurrently with changes in the international system, the role of the
state in Tanzania and Ethiopia also shifted from dictating to monitoring the economies.
The role of the state, according to Max Weber, is to maintain order and stability.
From a Marxist point of view, the state is an instrument ofexploitation and perpetuates
conflict among classes.32 Emmanuel Durkheim, for his part, defines the state as “the sum
total of social entities that alone are qualified to speak and act in the name of society.”33
Weber~s definition of the state seems to be more reflective of the role of the state in
contemporary socio-economic and political environments.
Given the importance of the state in command and transitional economies, the
role of the state is not only to maintain order and stability but also to act and speak in the
interest of the people it governs. However, in a market economic environment, some of
the role of the state has been transferred to the private sector. Therefore, in this study, the
state is defined not as an entity that alone speaks and acts in the name of society but as a
partner to the private sector.
Another term that requires clarification is the term “economic development”
In the theoretical literature, there has been much effort to distinguish between economic
development and economic growth. Some maintain that there can be economic growth
without development In this study, the two tenns are interchangeably used. The impact
of foreign investment and national development policy on economic growth or
32Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories ofComparative Politics: The Search fbr a Paradigm Reconsidered,
2nd edition,, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 121.
33Emmanuel Durkheim, Durkheim on Politics and the State (California: Stanford University Press,
1986), 45; edited by Anthony Giddens and translated by W. 1). Halls.
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development is measured in terms of changes in the percentage of literacy, life
expectancy, population with access to education, safe water, and health services.34
Limitations
The main limitation of this study is that it does not address the environmental
impact of foreign direct investment. However, it needs to be recognized that economic
growth requires exploiting labor and natural resources. How and in what capacity these
resources are exploited affects the economies ofEthiopia and Tanzania and their
environment. The interdependence between economic growth, foreign direct investment,
and the natural environment could be a zero—sum game.
Furthermore, this research does not include a discussion on the impact of foreign
direct investment on the cultures of Tanzania and Ethiopia. The exclusion of culture as
an integral part of this study is significant because value system for a given society
changes over time, making it difficult to measure such impact.
Examination of the changes in the culture of Tanzania and Ethiopia may also be
influenced by personal bias. For example, it may be difficult to measure the extent to
which foreign firms promoted or undermined cultural development of the Tanzanian and
Ethiopian societies. It would, therefore, be misleading to discuss cultural changes along
with changes in the economies of the two countries without greater detail and extended
field research.




This undertaking is based on an exploratory research methodology. It compares
and contrasts the inflows of foreign direct investments and the investment policies of
Ethiopia and Tanzania. In addition, it examines the role of the state in the economic
transformation of the two countries. Data in this research are secondary data that were
obtained from various sources. Many of the texts referred in the introductory and
literature review chapters were gathered from libraries including Clark Atlanta
University, Emory University, and Georgia State University. Some data have also been
obtained from the Internet
Investment policy proclamations and data on private investments were obtained
from the Ethiopian Investment Authority in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and from the
Tanzanian Investment Promotion Centre in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Other sources of
information for this research included the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank,
and the United Nations Human Development Programme annual publications.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter explores the two development models, central planning and free-
market economy, that have successively been adopted by Ethiopia and Tanzania It also
examines the role of the state and foreign capital and technology in the transformation of
the economies of the two countries. Shortages of capital and technology are recognized
as the two critical elements that inhibited economic growth in Ethiopia and Tanzania.
These shortages were more pronounced when Tanzania and Ethiopia were experimenting
with command economic strategy in which the states played an important role in
dictating and managing the economies.
Since the late 1980s, governments in both countries have abandoned central
planning development strategy and adopted a free-market economic model. This change
in development scheme required a redefinition of the role of the state and its relationship
with the private sector. To the extent that the state has the capacity to manage the
economy, its primary role is to determine the sectors that are open for foreign, domestic,
or public investment and set the rate of incentives available for the private sector.
The state is responsible for formulating and implementing investment policies and
allocating resources for human capital development. These and other related functions
of the state makes it an indispensable partner to the private sector. Ifa state is to
facilitate a congenial environment for the operation ofthe private sector and foster
economic growth, its role must be compatible with its capability. For example, it needs
to have the institutional and financial capacity to invest in public goods such as
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infrastructure, education, and health services where the gains for the private sector are
minimal.
The first section of this chapter explores how central planning economic policy, in
which the state directly intervened in economic activities, affected the rise of the private
sector in Ethiopia and Tanzania. Since the role of the state in developing countries has
changed along with changes in the global economic system, it is important to reexamine
its effectiveness and new roles. A number of examples are provided to gauge its capacity
and effectiveness in a free-market economic system. Subsequently, two sections are
devoted to discuss issues relating to capital accumulation and economic growth and the
extent to which technology transfer closes the digital gap between the developing and
advanced nations.
Central Planning As a Development Model
The end of the Second World War ushered in a new era that altered the
relationship between Western Europe and Africa. In less than two decades following the
end of the Second World War, many African countries gained their political
independence. Consequently, the relationship between these two regions changed from
dominance-dependence to interdependence’ However, as Inimanuel Wallerstein and
Peter Gutkind affirmed, in the process of colonization and decolonization, Africa is
“incorporated” into the capitalist world economy where it plays its marginal role in the
global economic system.2 After “independence,” many African governments sought for
a development model that would both sustain their political independence and reflect
‘For fi.irther discussion, see Cedric Grant “Equity in international relations: a Third World
perspective~” International Affairs 71, 3 (1995): 567-587,
2lmmanuel Wallerstein and Peter Gutkind, eds., The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa
(California: Sage Publications, 1976), 33.
21
their unique economic conditions. Anglo-American scholars constructed a. theoretical
frame of reference with which these nascent states transform their economies.3
The diagnosis of the conditions of Africa by Western scholars led to the
prescription that the transformation ofAfrica from underdevelopment to development
requires Western democratic culture and the implementation ofa free-market economic
policy. As John Rapley noted, for some Western scholars “the problem of the Third
World was a mere shortage of capital. . . - To others, it was a question of value systems:
Third World peoples lacked the cultural values such as the profit motive, which would
make them entrepreneurial.”4 As a result, the prescriptions “emphasized. . . on a
minimal role for the state, greater reliance on private initiative and market forces, and
increased openness and greater integration into the world economy.”5
Fidelis Ezeala-Harrison noted that the experiences of the developed countries
were accepted as evidence that the foreign sector could actually be the most important
source of capital for development.6 Many developing countries, however, feared that
opening their economies for foreign investment and adopting Western culture simply to
spur the flow of foreign capital and technology would interfere with their national
economic interests, political independence, and territorial sovereignty. For example, for
a stable level of capital flow by multinational corporations, there must be a significantly
3Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories ofComparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm Reconsidered
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 9.
4john R.apley, Understanding Development: Theory and Practice in the Third Worki (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 16.
5united Nations Conference on Trade And Development, Globalization. Distribution and Growth
(New York: United Nations, 1997), 65.
6Fidelis Ezeala-Harrison, Economic Development: Theory end Policy Applications (Connecticut:
Praeger Publishers, 1996), 134.
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low level of corporate and income tax rate, reliable infrastructure, and a stable political
environment7 A significantly low level of tax meant, however, lower revenue to
governments, which imposed financial constraints on the state and weakened its capacity
to effectively carry out its responsibilities.
For Ethiopia during the military regime and Tanzania during Nyerere’s era, these
prescriptions and preconditions were simply ramifications of history repeating itself, that
the reliance on Western capital inflows and cultural values would compromise their
political independence and the potential for economic self-reliance.8 Especially for
Tanzania, because of its colonial experiences, it was important to search for an alternative
development model that cultivates political solidarity and economic self-reliance.
Tanzania and Ethiopia adopted a command economic system, which was
developed and tested by socialist counties, countries that were not directly associated
with Africa’s colonial subjugation and whose economies were as underdeveloped as
Tanzanian and Ethiopiaa According to Francis Fukuyama, the Soviet Union is known
to have demonstrated the possibility of transforming an agrarian economy into an
industrial powerhouse. Fukuyama made reference to the Soviet Union under Joseph
Stalin as an example that “had accomplished a fantastic social transformation from a
largely peasant agricultural country to an industrial powerhouse, without permitting its
citizens either economic or political freedom.”9
In addition, as James Mittelman noted, “political solidarity,” particularly at an
initial phase of development, was viewed as an essential precondition for successful
7lbid.
8Colin Leys, The Rise and Fall ofDevelopment Theory (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1996): 188-196.
9Francis Fukuyania, The End of History aiid the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 90.
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economic development. He cited the East Asian newly industrializing countries as
examples that placed limitations on democratic rights in their drive for rapid economic
growth.’° Furthermore, the experiences ofthe advanced nations of the 19th and early
20th centuries were archetypes for policy-makers in developing countries in that the
states played a critical role in stimulating savings and investment and accelerating
industrialization.”
From the viewpoints of policy-makers in Ethiopia and Tanzania, the economic
histories of the industrialized, socialist, and newly industrializing nations were sufficient
to justify the need for political solidarity and the implementation of a development policy
that protects the economic interests of Tanzania and Ethiopi&
Policy-makers in both countries attempted to formulate a development policy to
stimu late economic growth and domestic capital formation through regulatory and
protective measures against foreign firms. These measures included tariffs and quotas on
imported goods, subsidies to public sectors, and the protection of infant industries.’2
Tariff and non-tariff barriers were imposed on foreign products with the hope of
stimulating domestic demand for goods and services produced mainly by the public
sector.
China, Brazil, India, and South Korea, among others, adopted Import Substitution
Industrialization (1ST) schemes and have been able to strengthen their private sectors,
increase savings and investment, and accelerate their economic growth. For the newly
WJames H. Mittelman, “The End of a Millennium: Changing Structures of World Order and the
Post-Cold War Division ofLabour,” in Larry k Swatuk and Timothy M. Shaw, eds, The South at the End
of the Twentieth Century (New York: St. Martints Press, 1994), 22.
~ extensive examination, see Arthur W. Lewis, The Theory of Economic Growth
(Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1955).
12Up~jt~çj Nations Conference on Trade And Development, World Investment Report 1998: Trends
and Determinants (New York: United Nations, 1998), 55.
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industrializing countries, ISI was a suitable development strategy. The implementation
of 1ST was perceived as an effective development approach because it was relatively easy
to protect their industries as compared with forcing developed nations to lower their trade
barriers.’3 In addition, provided that there exists a large domestic market for industrial
products, the implementation of this policy was to help escape the impact of unfavorable
tenThs of trade and price fluctuation for their primary products.’4
Tanzania and Ethiopia vigorously implemented 1ST strategy. They hoped to
promote industrialization by utilizing domestic resources to meet domestic demands and
by imposing barriers to foreign private enterprises. The implementation of 151 was also
to increase savings and foreign exchange that was previously spent on imported
manufactured goods.’5 Import Substitution Industrialization was a suitable development
approach for countries with foreign exchange constraints, weak private sectors, and large
domestic markets. For Tanzania and Etbiopia~, however, the result was disappointing.
The development model was unsuitable for the very reason that prompted the
implementation ofthe strategy: the protection of the domestic markets and infant
industries. The regulatory enactment undennined domestic private investment, hindered
the development of indigenous-based capital formation, and limited their access to the
industrialized nations’ markets, technology, and capital.
The emphasis on industrialization also diverted resources from investments in
other sectors to the industrial sector without cultivating linkages among the various
economic sectors. The lack of linkages among the various sectors coupled with the
13Dotninick Salvatore, International Economics, 5th edition, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1995), 345.
141b1d.
15See also, Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange (New York: Monthly Review PreSs, 1972).
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diversion of resources to the industrial sector inhibited productivity, particularly, of the
agricultural sector.’6 Low productivity of the agricultural sector brought a chain of
reactions and affected the demand for manufactured goods and decelerated domestic
savings and investment. The decline in domestic savings and investment, in turn,
resulted in little or no domestic capital formation and technological advancement. This
ultimately led to reliance on foreign resources which was conditional on structural
reform&’7
The most important weakness of the development model was, perhaps, the severe
restrictions imposed on the domestic private sector. As Friedrich List observed, inside a
country the policy of free trade is beneficial if citizens were free to manufhcture what
they pleased, and were not restricted by institutional and infrastructiiral constraints.’8
These and other constraints that were imposed through central planing policy instruments
on domestic and private sectors are no longer the case. In fact, it is not only Tanzania
and Ethiopia that removed the barriers to private-sector-led economic growth but also
other developing countries that effectively implemented ISI development schemes. By
the early 1990s, Ethiopia and Tanzania enacted firvorable investment policies to induce
the inflows of foreign capital and technology and lifted many ofthe restrictions that
inhibited domestic and foreign private sector’s participation in their economies.
The 1997 United Nations Conference on Trade And Development report indicates
that at least 143 countries and territories (including Ethiopia and Tanzania) enacted
favorable investment policies recognizing that the gains from foreign direct investment
16Ezeala-Harrison, Economic Development: Theory and Policy 4pvlications: 191-194.
t7Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development, 5th edition, (New York: Langman Publishers,
1994), 47.
‘8Friedrich List, The Natural System ofPolitical Economy (London: Frank Cass and Company
Limited, 1983), 25; translated and edited by W. 0. Henderson.
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would speed up the process of economic development’9
Market Economy as a Development Model
One of the most important developments in the internationa.l system that
prompted a re-visitation ofdevelopment policies was the end of the East-West
confrontation. The demise of the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe,
East Africa., and elsewhere proved that development without a significant involvement of
the private sector may be possible but unsustainable. It revitalized the conviction among
neoclassical economic theorists who argued:
In any society, growth can never be a purely quantitative affair but is
necessarily accompanied by changes in techniques, attitudes and
institutions. In the emergence of the industrial society, these changes are
ofpeculiar importance. They are not only the source ofthe more
measurable indications of growth but must find a place in any explanation
of how development begins.20
James Wolfensohn, in his address to the World Bank Board of Governors in 1998,
supported the neoclassical view when he stated: “development involves a totality of
effort.”2’ He admitted that the international development community had not taken a
wholistic approach to tackle the challenges faced by many of the developing countries.22
In his view, a free-market economy (or the wholislic development strategy) offers a more
pragmatic and broad-based approach to transform the economies ofthe developing
countries.
~United Nations Conference on Trade And Development, World Investment Report 1998: Trends
and Determinants (New York: United Nations, 1998). 55.
20A K. Cairncross, ‘Capital Formation in the Take-Off,” in W. W. Rostow, ed., The Economics
ofTake-Ofl’Jnto Sustained Growth (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965), 241.
21Jnmes D Wolfensohn, “The Other Crisis,” speech delivered at the World Bank Board of
Governors meeting (Washington: 6 October 1998).
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In a free-market economic environment, economic power is diffused among the
private sectors and the state stimulates growth by managing, but not regulating, the
economy. Economic growth is stimulated and the effectiveness of the state is enhanced
when the state is “permitting competitive free markets, privatizing state owned
enterprises, promoting free trade and export expansion, [and] welcoming investors from
developed countries.”23 As List maintained, the domestic private sector contributes to
economic growth when it is left to its own devices. In cooperation with the state, the
private sector would help speed up the process ofeconomic growth when trade bathers
are lifted and reliable infrastructures exist. The notion of cooperation between the state
and the private sector is as indispensable to a steady economic growth as the principle of
the division of labor.24
The implementation of a free-market economic policy is to remove the factors
that hinder the ability of the private sector to operate smoothly. The elimination of trade
barriers and quotas, for example, allow the free flow of goods and services. When a free-
market economic policy is implemented broadly, foreign and domestic private sectors
compete for markets, cheap labor, and raw material. Competition among the private
sectors would, in turn, reduce the price of goods and services.
Another factor that affects the effectiveness of the private sector in mobilizing
resources and accelerating productivity is the condition of the communication system.
According to the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, underdeveloped
infrastructure including telecommunication and transport systems are unique challenges
23T~j~o, Economic Development, 85.
24List, The Natural System ofPolitical Economy, 28.
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to the economies in transition.25 Reliable infrastructures facilitate the economic
activities of the private sector and because the financial gains for investment in these
services are unattractive to the private sector, the state is accorded the responsibility of
improving the condition ofthe communication systems. However, shortages of capital
constrain the state from carrying out its responsibility of providing a reliable means of
transportation and communication.
Many have argued that in order to effectively utilize scarce resources and match
the capability of the state with its responsibilities, there must exist a division of labor
between the state and the private sectors. Furthermore, public and private investments
must be allocated to economic sectors based on the principle of comparative advantage.26
Some policy-makers and scholars maintain that agricultural transformation is the key to
broad-based economic growth in the developing world and that development policies
need to be formulated toward transforming the agricultural sector. What follows is an
examination of the effectiveness of the state in a free-market economic environment and
whether or not Ethiopia’s and Tanzania~s comparative advantage lies in the production of
agricultural commodities.
A. The Role of the State in a Free-Market Economic System
The resignation ofMwalimu Nyerere from power and the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the military regime ofEthiopia signaled that successful transformation of an
economy necessitates more than resource mobilization. A successful economic
transformation requires the liberalization of the economic and political marketplaces
25United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, The Triad in Foreign Direct Investment.
ST/CTS/1 18 (New York: United Nations, 1~91), 14.
26The World Bank, World Development Report 1997 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 3.
29
simultaneously. The economic crisis that took place in these countries was partly
associated with the consolidation ofpolitical and economic powers in the hands of a few
elites and the transfer of property from private owners to the state.27 In other words,
in central planning development system, the state was everything. Because the state was
everything, it essentially overextended itself from carrying out its primary responsibilities
of defending national sovereignty, protecting citizens’ rights, and providing public or
collective goods to become an agent of social, economic, and political transformations.28
The Tanzanian and Ethiopian states did not have the financial and institutional
capacities to deal with the economic challenges facing their countries, and the model with
which they attempted to address these challenges was not akin to the unique
circumstances of the two countries. The states were arrested by their own piecemeal but
ambitious development strategy. They neither delivered public goods and increased
national savings and investments nor accelerated domestic capital formations. As
recognition of the weaknesses of the states in many of the developing countries including
Ethiopia and Tanzania, advocates of the wholistic development approach hold that
matching roles to capability is essential for mobilizing resources efficiently.
The World Bank correctly pointed out that matching roles to capability is not a
simple message to dismantle the state or to redirect the role of the state to provide basic
services and build roads and provide infrastructure.29 It is, however, to foster cooperation
and partnership between the state and the private sector; it is a division of labor among
27Lewis, The Theory ofEconomic Growth, 60.
2sj0~ Rapley, Understanding Development: Theory and Practice in the Third World (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 6.
29The World Bank, Wor1d Development Report 1997.The State in a Changing World, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1997), 3.
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social, economic, and political actors. “The transition from centrally planned to market
economies creates, at least in the short run, major economic uncertainties” which could
be dealt with effectively when a division of labor exists among social and economic
actors and the state.3°
In an environment of competition and conflict, the role of the state is to resolve
disputes arising between domestic and foreign private sectors and manage conflicts
resulting from contradictory economic interests between labor unions and the private
sector. When a market economic policy is enforced in its broadest sense of the term,
foreign and domestic private sectors compete for markets, cheap labor, and raw material.
Although the private sectors compete for resources and market outlets, they are unified
by their common interests of reducing production cost. The working class, on the other
hand, aspires for higher wages which translate into higher production cost and lower
profits for the private sectors. Therefore, there are disputes between the private sectors
and conflicts between them and the working class.
If disputes are resolved, conflicts are managed, and the state is an arbitrator of
disputes and conflicts, then competitions between the private sectors are disputes that
could be resolved by the state. On the other hand, competition between the private
sectors (or employers) and labor unions are conflicts that can be managed but not
reconciled by the state. The strategy for managing conflicts between labor unions and
employers may be different but the objective is to safeguard unfair practices by
employers or labor unions. The role of the state as a mediator of conflicts or disputes is
driven by the interest to stabilize the economy and avoid dramatic shifts (for example, the
gravitation of competition into conflict or monopolistic practices by giant corporations).
30united Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, The Triad in Foreign Direct Investment.
ST/CTS/118 (New York: United Nations, 1991), 14.
31
In the absence of a middle ground or when competition gravitates towards conflict, the
state acts like a lion to maintain order and undermine conflict.3’
Therefore, if a state is to play its proper role in economic development it must, at
least, be effective enough to exert reasonable influence on other states, private sectors,
and its citizens. It must also have the institutional capacity to formulate and implement
development policies that facilitate the participation of the private sector and redistribute
the gains from international trade and investment. Consequently, for any development
strategy to be pragmatic and effective, it must rectify the weaknesses of the previous
development scheme. However, given the institutional, financial, technological, and
capital underclevelopment in many parts ofAfrica and most certainly in Tanzania and
Ethiopia, some problem surface with the wholistic development strategy when it is
implemented in the broadest sense ofthe term.
For example, a prudent tax system could serve as a mechanism for redistributing
the gains from market..led economic growth. Revenues generated from the collection of
taxes and customs duties could be invested in building and expanding infrastructure and
the human capital stock. With the declining role of the state in the economic arena, the
public sector could not be a primary source of revenue and, therefore, revenues must be
directly derived from other sources such as the private sector. However, there are
problems with this approach of generating revenue from the private sector. First, the tax
system in Tanzania and Ethiopia, as it is the case in many parts of Africa, is inefficient.
Hence, the rudimentary system of tax collection could not extract sufficient funds that are
necessary for the states to manage their economies.
31Riindall Schweller, 11Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,”
International Security 19 (1994): 72-107; quoted in Richard Rosecrance and Chih-Cheng Lo, “Balancing,
Stability, and War: The Mysterious Case of the Napolenic International System,” International Studies
Ouarterly 40(1996): 479-500.
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In addition, governments may need to broaden the tax base to protect the poor and
small-scale private sectors.32 This leads to the second problem of generating revenue for
investment in the public services that are prerequisites to bring about economic
development in the two countries. As it is stated in the investment policies of Tanzania.
and Ethiopia, lower corporate tax, tax holidays, and freedom for the private sector to
repatriate its profits are means of increasing the flow of foreign capital and technology.
Lowering corporate taxes, granting tax holidays, and significantly improving
infrastructure may, therefore, be mismatches of development policies. In other words, it.
creates revenue dependency on a few taxpayers and results in disincentives for the
domestic private sectors.
The extent to which the governments of Tanzania and Ethiopia have the financial
and institutional capacity to play their role in regulating monopolistic practices, as
effectively as their trading partners, is vital to understand the complex challenges facing
the economies in transition. The role of the United States government in harnessing
competition among private sectors and the agricultural policies ofWestern European
governments reveal the complexity of the challenges to the governments of Ethiopia and
Tanzania in a free-market economic arena. Important lessons can be derived from the
role of the United States government and the agricultural policies of Western European
governments.
On May 18, 1998, the United States Department ofJustice filed a lawsuit alleging
that “Microsoft has engaged, and continues to engage, in a broad course of conduct that
improperly maintains Microsoffs monopoly in desktop operating systems and unlawfully
32The World Bank, Poverty Reduction Handbook (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1993), 36.
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restrains trade.”33 According to a report in The Washington Post, “Microsoft Corp. has
used its unparalleled dominance in the computer industry to bully rivals and squelch
competition.”34 More recently, the Department ofJustice “filed a civil antitrust lawsuit
to block the $168 million cash tender offer by Compuware Corporations to acquire
Viasoft Inc., because the transaction would result in higher prices and lower quality
service” to consumers.35
It can be inferred that the Department ofJustice, as a machinery of the state, is
acting in the interests ofAmericans by promoting competition among the private sectors.
It is also monitoring and regulating monopolistic practices, creating a level playing field,
and protecting “infant” industñes lii effect, the state is promoting competition but
undermining conflict This is possible because the United States government has the
financial and institutional capacities to implement effective regulatory policies.
Therefore, the role of the state is, as demonstrated by the Department ofJustice,
to act as an independent entity in the interests of the peoples governed.36 The role of the
states in Tanzania and Ethiopia, due to their economic, social, and political
circumstances, is greater than their counterparts in advanced nations. In addition to what
has been said above, the governments of Tanzania and Ethiopia need to “ensure that the
33Department of Justice, “Statement of Subject Matter and Appellate Jurisdiction)” http:/fwww.
usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1900/1947.htm; accessed 8 November 1999; Internet.
34Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Judge Says Microsoft Wields Monopoly Power Over Rivals,” Thc
Washington Post, (6 November 1999), Sec. Al.
35Department ofJustice, “Justice Department Files Lawsuit to Block Compuware’s Acquisition of
Viasoft,” www.usdoj.gov/atr, released 29 October 1999.
36J. W. Burton, International Relations: A General Theory (London: Cambridge University Press,
1967): 255-256.
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benefits of market-led growths are shared, particularly through investments in basic
education and health”37
B Broad-Based Agricultural Development Strategy
Strategic consideration is one of the most important aspects of public policy
formulation and implementation, irrespective of the level of advancement of any
economy. When planning a development policy, one has to take into consideration
available resources and ensure that these resources are efficiently utilized. Japan, for
example, is one of the poorest in natural resources but it is among the leading economic
powers in the world. Among the factors that led Japan to become an economic giant is
not that policy-makers there invented the wheels to transform their economy but rather
they invested their resources in the production of goods and services where the country
has comparative advantage.
Similarly, the governments ofEthiopia and Tanzania strive to accommodate the
environment within which the private sector engages in the economic sectors where the
two countries have comparative advantage and strategic interests. For example,
Christopher Delgado observed that the agricultural sector in Africa accounts for 70% of
total employment, 40% of merchandise export and 33% of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP).38 Delgado argued that agriculture is central to economic growth and the
alleviation ofpoverty in Africa. For him, agricultural transformation through increased
“specialization, greater use of purchased inputs, greater resource inflows to farming from
other sectors and substantial cuts in unit costs of production due to technological change”
37The World Bank, World Development Report 1997. The State in a Changing World, 4.
38Christopher Delgado, Agricultural Transformation: The Key to Broad.Based Growth and
Poverty Alleviation in Africa (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996), 151.
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is key to Africa’s economic growth. Based on this premise, he asserts that Africa has
comparative advantage in the production ofagricultural commoditjes.39
The recent Policy Framework Paper developed by the Ethiopian government, in
cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, concurs with Delgado’s view in that it
slated that “agriculture and rural development is the highest priority of the
government.”40 Given the percentage ofpopulation engaged in the agricultural sector
(80% and 84% of the labor force as of 1995 in Ethiopia and Tanzania, respectively), the
contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP for the same year (57% in Ethiopia and
58% in Tanzania),4’ and the significance ofbackward and forward linkages to economic
security, it is easy to assume that if the economies ofEthiopia and Tanzania are to
reinvigorate they must necessarily be anchored around the agricultural sector.
That resources should be allocated to increase productivity in the agricultural
sector is morally and strategically relevant. However, this policy proposal may not be
economically feasible due to the lessons derived from the command economic systems
which favored and “delinked” one sector from the other. Given the two countries
endeavor to benefit from a free-market economic environment, which presumes a broad-
based development approach, the most obvious weakness of the assertion is that it opts
for sectorial development by allocating resources to the agricultural sector. This is a
contradiction to the principle of broad-based development policy.
Furthermore, the technological advancement in Europe and North America,
(which Delgado seems to accept unequivocally) significantly reduces the cost of
39Ibid, 153-158.
40The Government of Ethiopia, “Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility: Medium-Term
Economic and Financial Policy Framework Paper, 1998/2001,” available from http://www.imf.org/
extema1/np/pf~/eth/etp.htm; Internet, accessed 10 November 99.
41The World Bank, World Development Report 1997. The State in a Changing World, 220-236.
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production and, thus, the price ofagricultural commodities. This has a critical
implication on the successful transformation of the economies in transition. The
advanced nations have, for example, developed substitutes for coffee and sugar and
manufactured synthetic leather that causes a decline in commodity prices for African
farmers. As Emmanuel Egbe pointed out, “the buyers of tropical raw materials may
develop temperate substitutes due to cost consideration and for strategic and security
reasons.”42 The ability to develop substitutes is correlated with technological
advancement; so is the extent to which governments create a level playing field between
competing groups.
A report by the United States Trade Representative also indicated that the
“European Community grants export subsidies.. . on a wide range ofagricultural
products including wheat, wheat flour, beef, diary products, poultry, and certain fruits, as
well as some manufactured products such as pasta..”43 The export subsidies provide
Western farmers even more advantage over African poor farmers.44 Due to the financial
capabilities and institutional effectiveness, Western nations are likely to allocate greater
subsidies to their farmers than their African counterparts. In addition to subsidies,
advanced communication and transport systems provide Western farmers greater
leverages over their counterparts in Africa. In comparison with other countries and,
especially with its main trading partner (Western Europe), Africa lacks the technology for
42Emmanuel Chinycre Egbe, “Agricultural Exports and the Agenda for Accelerated Development
In Africa,” ~h~Review ofBlack political Economy (Fall 1991): 65-69.
43Office ofthe United States Trade Representative, 1991 National Trade Estimate Renort on
Foreign Trade Barriers (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1992), 86.
~thid.
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accurately forecasting weather. It also lacks advanced techniques to increase productivity
and reduce cost
Thus, it is highly unlikely that African countries have comparative advantage in
the production ofagricultural commodities. Benno Ndulu, Nicolas van de Walle, and
others pointed out that the unpredictability and instability of sub—Saharan Africa’s
economies is partly attributable to its “higher dependence on the price-volatile primary
products.” They argue that Africa’s economic growth lies on a development strategy that
takes into account the importance of sequencing and timing of policy formulation and
implementation, strengthening domestic institutions, pursuing economic and political
reforms simultaneously, and on an education system that reflects the development needs
of the people.45
As the World Bank report suggests, in an era of free-market economy the choices
are many and must be tailored to the circumstance of each country.46 In other words,
Tanzania and Ethiopia need not invent the wheels to march toward development What
may be necessary is that the role of the state in creating a level playing field between the
domestic and foreign private sectors must be enhanced and investment policies must
reflect the unique circumstances of the host nations.
From the above discussions, it can be inferred that states with rudimentary
technologies and weak capital, institutional, and financial bases could not effectively
manage their economies and regulate practices that are hostile to the growth and
development of domestic private sectors. Although the economic power of the
developing countries has not improved significantly, as a result of the new world order
45Benno Ndulu, and Nicolas van de Wafle, Agenda For Africa’s Economic Renewal (New
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996): 8-11.
46The World Bank, World Development Report 1997, The State in a Changing World, 3-4.
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“that is at once urn-polar and multi-polar,”47 the opportunities for developing countries to
transform their economies are far greater now than they were during the bi-polar world
era. Because the world is no longer hi-polar, the uncertainty or diffusion ofpower
suggests that the bargaining leverage of poor countries would be enhanced.
The enhancement of the bargaining leverages ofdeveloping countries is evident
from their economic growth. For example, the World Bank Africa Region reported that
“In 33 countries [in Africa], economic growth now exceeds population increases,
allowing for a modest improvement in per capita incomes for the first time in decades.”48
This modest improvement (but significant when viewed from the vantage point of
Afric&s poor economic performance in the past three decades) is associated with the
increasing flow of foreign investment which brings with it new techniques of reducing
the cost ofproduction; namely, capital and technology.
Capital Accumulation and Economic Growth
As indicated throughout this paper, Tanzania and Ethiopia have liberalized their
economies in an effort to broaden their access to foreign markets and benefit from
industrialized nations’ technologies and capital. The advanced nations, In turn, are said
to have opened their markets and invest in the economies of Tanzania and Ethiopia. The
underlying assumption embodied in the new development policies adopted by Tanzania
and Ethiopia is the belief that their economic growth depends on the rate of savings and
investment. Domestic savings and investment could be improved by permitting the flow
of capital and technology into their economies. An increase in productivity, resulting
47Cedric Grant, “Equity in international relations: a Third World perspective,” International
Affairs 73, 3 (1995): 567-587.
48The World Bank Africa Region, “Briefmg on Africa for the White House Press Corps,”
(Washington. DC: World Bank, 17 March 1998).
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from the inflows of capita.l and technology, will then be accompanied by an increase in
domestic savings, investment, and capital formation.
Many scholars observed a linear relationship between savings and investment
and its implication on economic stability. They argued that maintaining this linear
relationship is essential for economic stability. In other words, savings is equal to
investment, and as long as this equality is maintained there will be no tendency for
economic instability.49 Charles Jones took the view that there is a linear relationship
between capital accumulation and economic growth. He pointed out that the “decline in
capital aecumulation. . . reduces the growth rate ofthe economy.”50 Given the lower
rate of savings and investment in Tanzania and Ethiopia, the main source of capital and
technology would have to be the foreign private sectors. It follows that the rate of
economic growth is directly associated with the rate of investment inflows.
For Thomas Lairson and David Skidmore, foreign investment is more than a
vehicle that delivers capital and technology. They argued that the flow ofphysical
capital and technology into the developing countries not only increases productivity but
also enhances their access to the extensive foreign marketing networks available to
Northern fii-ius5’ Their position was very much in line with the views of prominent
Western scholars including W. W. Rostow, Arthur Lewis, and others. These
distinguished scholars have long argued that economic growth is a linear function of
capital. Lewis and Rostow contributed immensely to development discourse and policy
where the latter constructed “the stages of economic growth” from a historical point of
4~Ezeala-Harrison, Economic Development: Theory and Policy Applications, 86.
50Charles I. Jones, “Economic growth arid the relative price of capital,” Journal ofMonetary
Economics 34 (1994), 360,
51Thomas D. Lairson and David Skidmore, International Political Economy: The Struggle for
Power and Wealth (New York: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1993), 259.
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view and the former sought to develop and apply a theory of economic growth to
developing countries.
Arthur Lewis published his seminal work, The Theory ofEconomic Growth,
almost a decade before Africa’s independence from colonial nile. In The Theory of
Economic Growth, he observed that in the Third World very little capital exists and very
little employment is offered by capitalists. He further contended that the peasant sector
of the economy is steeped with surplus labor and that this unproductive labor needed to
be mobilized into the industrial sector.52 Moreover, Lewis maintained that the supply of
labor could be controlled by the demand in the capitalist sector. Since the capitalist
sector in developing countries lacked capital and technology, a larger proportion of these
crucial elements of productivity had to come from abroad. He also emphasized that
domestic savings combined with foreign investment increase productivity which, in turn,
increase the rate of profit.. Profit from both domestic and foreign investments would then
be reinvested to generate more investment (and thus more profit).53
Lewis was also keen in identi~iing a source of revenue to accelerate
industrialization in the urban centers. He noted that the agricultural sector in developing
countries constitutes 50% to 60% of the national income and, consequently, he suggested
that it makes economic sense to draw on resources from that sector.54 He argued that “at
a time when profits for business enterprises are low and their expansion is necessary for
industrialization, there is no other way of accelerating capital formation and savings than
to levy substantially upon agriculture.”55
52Lewis, The Theory of Economic Growth, 233.
53Ibid.
54Lewis, The Theory ofEconomic Growth, 231.
55Ibid.
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Simon Kuznets also concurs with Lewis when he argued that Third World
countries expenence distressingly low productivity per worker in the agricultural sector.56
In other words, the productivity of labor was low when viewed from the point of view of
the law ofdiminishing returns — the more labor is applied to a fixed capital the lower its
contribution to productivity.
Rostow viewed all societies as progressing in a linear fashion toward capitalistic
development. For him, progress towards advancement follows an evolutionary process.
Thus, the economies of traditional societies advance toward the pre-conditions for take
off. Societies in the pre-conditions for take-off make headway to the take-offstage; from
the take-offstage to the drive to maturity; and from the drive to maturity to the stage of
high mass consumptiolt This development model was attractive because it said nothing
about disruption or revolutionary transformation of society.
The linear stages of economic growth also seemed to simplify the complex
process ofdevelopment by relating development to a few factors of production such as
capital and technology. Once scarcity and surplus of the factors ofproduction are
identified, policy-makers would then formulate a development framework accordingly.
For example, traditional societies are characterized by low level productivity, unskilled
labor, and chronic shortages of capital and technology. The necessary economic reform
policy would, therefore, take into account the formation of capital, transfer of technology,
and training of the labor force.
Rostow also recognized the agricultural sector as the principal driving force
behind the process of industrialization and argued that an “increase in agricultural
~Simon Kuznets, Six Lectures On Econoniic Gro’wth (Chicago: The Free Press, 1959), 60.
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production and productivity plays a multiple role in economic development”57 He
argued that the industrial sector is financed by incomes generated from heavily taxing the
agricultural sector; and, the supply of cheap means of subsistence (through pricing
mechanisms) increases the rate of savings for the urban laborer.58
While the process of capital formation and technology transfer could be
consummated in the short-run, particularly by opening up an economy for foreign
investment, the economic gains from investment in human capital are usually a long-term
one. Additionally, with financial constraints taken into consideration, the development
policy would have to emphasize foreign investment as a means ofaccelerating economic
growth rather than allocating scarce resource on investment in capacity development. As
Lewis noted:
If the choice is between local capital and foreign capital, then the
advantage may lie with the former, but if, as is more often the case, the
choice lies between foreign capital or leaving resources undeveloped, then
there is little doubt that foreign investment plays a most useful role in
providing income to pay for higher standards of consumption, of
education, and of domestic investment. .. . In most countries at a low
level of development it is the foreigner who brings new techniques, and it
is the spread of these new techniques among the people which carries
development along. ~
Kuznets, for his part, argued:
While it is true that increased productivity on land and the resulting
surplus population to be drained off the farms necessitate employment
opportunities elsewhere ... the setting up of a small number of advanced
57W. W. Rostow, The Economics ofTake-Off Into Sustained Growth (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1964), 13.
58Ibid.
59Lewis, The Theory ofEconomic Growth, 258.
43
industrial plants [are] usually characterized by high capital and low labor
intensity. 60
He also observed that “such preoccupation may easily and rapidly lead to an imbalance
between a few advanced production sectors and underdeveloped agriculture that
undermine the very process of capitalist development”6’ However, particularly in the
case of Tanzania and Ethiopia, efforts to increase capital formation in the industrial sector
may have actually slowed the process of industrialization and caused a dramatic decline
in the productivity of the agricultural sector.
Some attribute the decline in productivity to lack of incentives, distorted pricing
mechanisms, and excessive tax systems which imposed a heavier burden on the
agricultural sector. These deficiencies in policy frameworks were disincentives for
farmers to remain engaged in the production ofagricultural goods. For the farmers, it
made perfect economic sense to abandon their lots in search ofemployment in the urban
sector where commodities were relatively cheaper.
Other prominent scholars had quite opposing views regarding capitalist
development, generally, and the transfer of capital and technology, particularly. Karl
Marx, Rosa Luxemburg, Paul Baran, Samir Amin, and others took the position that the
acciimulation of capital in a few ofthe advanced nations was a source of
underdevelopment of the Third World.62 For these scholars and their proponents,
overproduction and accumulation of capital goods in some region lead to the search for
market outlets in other regions where these capital goods are in short supply.
60Kuznets, Six Lectures On Economic Growth, 60.
61lbid
625~p~fr Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), 169.
44
Marx devoted three volumes to explore the essence and purpose ofcapitaL In his
first volume, Marx stated that “a machine that does not serve the purpose of labor, is
useless.”63 A machine becomes useless or its value declines under conditions of
overproduction and accumulation. To make it productive, it needs to be exported to
countries where capital is in high demand (usually to “backward countries”), profits are
usually high, the price of land is relatively low, and labor and raw materials are cheap.
In Marx’s view, in countries where this surplus capital is exported, the capitalist
repeatedly converts capital into a machine that throws the producer ofadditional capital
out of work.64
How do Marxists explain the rate of profit in “backward” countries being usually
high? In their view, the capitalist could maximize the rate ofprofit by investing in
capital-intensive industries if the marginal productivity of capital is higher in relation to
labor-intensive industries. In this case, profit is derived from lower cost of production.
There are two other ways where the capitalist increases the rate ofprofit for its surplus
capital: by the sale of the surplus capital which is cheaper in advanced nations and
expensive in underdeveloped countries and by paying lower wages to the working class
in the “backward” countries.
Technology Transfer and Economic Development
Simon Kuznets, Robert Solow, and others pointed out that the transfer of
technology from developed nations is essential for Third World countries’ economic
growth. Solow argued that technology is “a prime determinant of economic growth
63Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), 178; translated by Samuel
Moore and Edward Aveling.
64lbid, 546.
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throughout the workL”65 He maintained that the transfer of technology is facilitated if
the culture, political ideology, and monetary policy of the recipient nation are in harmony
with the home nation Thus, less advanced countries should create the environment for
the transfer oftechnology from advanced countries by implementing policies to remove
barriers to the transfer of technologies.
According to Solow, there are three tracks of technology transfer: the single, the
new, and the cross-track technology transfer& In the single-track model, the transfer of
technology “follows an established slot in a going operation.”~ The second is the new-
track model. This model requires laying a new track or foundation in host economies that
is operationally different from the pre-existing ones The third is the cross-track transfer.
A cross-track transfer of technology takes place if the technology of the host economies
is cognate with that of the home economies. Furthermore, Solow observed that:
- . the transfer of new technology to developing countries are new
transfers, except that the track that must be laid is likely to be not simply
the operation of a new firm. . but the brining into being of an
institutional, technical, cultural infrastructure as a context for organization
and operation.67
The choice ofadapting the single, the new, or the cross-track model depends on the
structure ofthe economies and the development policies pursued by the host nations
Whichever track is adapted, foreign direct investment plays a crucial role as a channel
through which advanced technology is transferred from one nation to another.
E. Borensztein, J. De Giregorio, J-W. Lee examined the effect of foreign direct
investment on economic growth and whether or not the inflow of foreign technology
65Robert Solow and Everett Rogers, eds, Inducing Technological Change For Economic Growth
And Development (Michigait Michigan State University Press, 1972), 5.
67Ibid.
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“crowds-out” or “crowds-in” domestic technology and domestic private investment
Borensztein, Gregorio, and Lee argued that “foreign direct investment contributes to
economic growth only when a sufficient absorptive capability of the advanced
technology is available;” namely, the human capital stock measured by the initial-year
level of average years of the male secondary schooling.68 I:
Given the minimum threshold stock of human capital stock in the host nation,
they asserted that foreign direct investment closes the technological gap and that it
crowds-in, rather than crowds-out, domestic technology and private investment69 If
strategic considerations such as the fear of immediate or future competition exist in host
economies, then the strategies adopted by foreign investors would be to maximize short-
term profit. In the absence of immediate threat of competition, the transfer of
technology “from the advanced North to the lagging South occurs only slightly ahead of
the Southern technology frontier)’70
The extent to which the transfer of technology either through the single, the new,
or the cross-track model contributes to economic growth in Ethiopia and Tanzania partly
depends on their socio-economic and political structures. In other words, harmony in
social, political, and economic structure between host and home economies are necessary
but not sufficient conditions for the transfer of technology. Even if these preconditions
are satisfied -- the structures of the host and home economies are compatible -- the
transfer of technology would still be constrained by the absorptive capacity of the
recipient nation.
~E. Borensztein, J. De Gregorio, and J-W. Lee, “How Does Foreign Direct Investment Affect
Economic Growth?,” Journal of International Economics 45 (1998): 115.
69~~j~j
70Amy Jocelyn Glass and Katnal Saggi, “International Technology Transfer and the Technology
Gap,” Journal ofDevelopment Economics 55 (1998): 370.
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Amy Jocelyn Glass and Kamal Saggi offer a different perspective on the interplay
between technology transfer and economic growth. While others argued that the stock of
human capital significantly constrains technology transfer, Glass and Saggi stressed that
indigenous technological capability in an industry effectively constrains its ability to
absorb foreign technology.”7’ For Glass and Saggi, investment in human capital narrows
the technological gap between host and home economies. Furthermore, a high level of
human capital in host economies is an incentive for foreign firms. This is because trained
employees would be available to operate the new state-of-the-art machinery. Glass and
Saggi concluded that technology transfer is best achieved through the cross-track method
(one of Solow’s models) and that mere technology transfer does not guarantee sustainable
economic growth.
Paul Krugman, on the other hand, argued that the transfer of new technologies is
possible when there is continuous innovation by the North. In his view, the technological
gap between the North and the South can be seen as beneficial to the North and the
South. Under competitive markets, the North is induced by the South to invent new
technologies. Krugman further pointed out that, for every new technology transferred,
the South~s technological advancement is pressed at least one step ahead of its previous
advancement, but at least one step backward to that of the North!s technological
advancement Under these circumstances, the transferred technologies are always wholly
new or contain partly new technology. Whatever the compositions of the technologies
transferred to the South, they are only new to the South but never to the North. Krugman
71lbid.
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concluded that the North’s monopoly of innovation is continually eroded by technology
transfer and must be maintained by constant innovation ofnew technologies]2
For Solow, Krugman, and others the underlying assumption is that the South has
no comparative advantage in invention and innovation. In light of this, the technological
gap between the North and the South would be a continuous process of invention
innovation, and absorption. In this process of invention, innovation, and transfer the
South remains a market outlet for the North’s technology. Old technologies in the North
will be new technologies in the South and the gap is maintained as inducement for the
North to continue its invention and innovation, and for the South to continue adopting
foreign technologies to its peculiar needs.
On the other hand, the faster the South absorbs the North’s technology, the slower
the North’s innovation, the narrower the technological gap, which is a highly unlikely
proposal. It is an unlikely scenario because the North has an economic interest in
speeding up its technological advancements. Moreover, the very meaning of the term
“technology transfer” presupposes a technological gap between the host and home
economies. For “technology transfer” to take place as a continuous process, there must
be scarcity of technology in the recipient nation.
72Paul Krugman, Rethinking international Trade (Massachusetts: The Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Press, 1990), 147.
CHAPTER III
INVESTMENT POLICY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Almost a decade ago, Tanzania and Ethiopia were among the leading proponents
of socialism in Africa. Since the late 1 980s, both countries have embraced market
economy and, as a result, have been experiencing a shift in values, traditions, and beliefs.
Capitalistic doctrine and political ideology are replacing faith in the socialist world order
and the “divine power” of the proletariat. These changes are being reinforced by the
belief that there is not “an ever increasing pursuit of profit accumulation among capitalist
firms,” and that the objective of opening an economy for foreign private investment is
not to systematically displace workers and substitute them with advanced technologies.2
The investment policies of Tanzania and Ethiopia aim at mobilizing natural and
human resources in the primary interest of the nationals and creating a favorable
environment for foreign and domestic private investment. Consequently, as markets
open for foreign investment aimed at enhancing the development objectives ofboth
countries, public policies must create a suitable environment for foreign investments
including reliable transportation and communication systems.
Given that there is a deep-seated shortage of capital in Tanzania and Ethiopia,
foreign investment serves as a vehicle to deliver physical capital and technology. This is
contingent upon fostering an environment conducive to the operation of the private sector
1Fidelis Ezeala-Han-ison, Economic Development: Theory and Policy Application (Connecticut:
Praeger Publishers, 1996), 82.
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and on reducing the role of the state as the primary producer and consumer of goods and
services.
Some scholars and policy-makers recognize that the state is best suited for
managing an economy. In this regard, the important role played by the state is evident in
the proclamation of investment and development policies. With this division of labor
between the state and the private sector, it is anticipated that the delivery of physical
capital by foreign private enterprises would usually be accompanied by a high rate of
domestic capital formation, gross domestic product, employment, and economic growth.3
By liberalizing their economies, Tanzania and Ethiopia seek to benefit from the
industrialized nations’ technology, capital, markets, and management and entrepreneurial
skills. Economic liberalization policy is also an effort to increase the production of goods
and services for the domestic market in Tanzania and Ethiopia and to efficiently utilize
the countries’ natural and human resources. Conventional belief holds that economic
liberalization would bring handsome rewards including specialization, tax revenues, and
employment opportunities to the host nation economies.
Access to foreign markets induces an increase in the production of goods and
services which, in turn, helps improve the balance ofpayments and foreign exchange
earning. This will allow governments to allocate resources for human capital
development: the expansion of health services, education, and infrastructure. An increase
in the human capital stock will, in turn, determine the rate of technology transfer. Other
rewards from opening their economies for foreign investment are increases in energy
consumption, access to safe water and sanitation, and urbanization.
3w. W. Rostow, ed, The Economics of Take-Off Into Sustained Growth (New York: St. Martins
Press, 1965), 244.
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Furthermore, economic liberalization facilitates an increase in the rate of savings
and investment which, in turn, narrows the capital gap and leads to economic growtlt
The cyclical “savings-investment-capital-growth” process is believed to pave the way for
capitalistic development ofagrarian economies of Tanzania and Ethiopia Although there
are greater expectations of and beliefs in the capacity of the private sector to deliver the
crucial elements that increase productivity, a country’s ability to reap the gains from
private investment largely depends on a pragmatic development policy formulation and
implementation.
Formulating and implementing investment policy is complex, to such a degree
that virtually all African governments have repetitious investment policies. Perhaps these
may have arisen from their involvement in the Cold War and from the foreign debt that
has been accumulated since the mid-1970s. It may also be the result of the economic
structure inherited from the imperial powers. Although some or all of these factors
influence the development strategies of Tanzania and Ethiopia, both governments must
demonstrate their ability to eclipse the various structural and functional barriers and lead
their countries toward economic development.
Most of the investment policies formulated by African policy-makers highlight
cheap labor, abundant raw materials, tax holidays, repatriation ofprofits, and large
domestic markets as incentives for foreign investors. Despite these similarities in
incentives, some countries have attracted more foreign private investment than others.
The degree of openness for foreign investment also varies significantly from one country
to another. For example, some countries have privatized the communication sector on
the belief that the coordination of the various sectors and the mobilization of resources
and products necessarily require optimal utilization of this part of the infrastructure.
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Although other countries may recognize the importance of integrating
communication with other economic sectors, they may reserve this integration for public
investment as a means to ensure national security. Albeit there are differences and
similarities in investment policies that may exist among countries or between Tanzania
and Ethiopia, their common objective is to bring about economic development.
A. Investment Policy of Tanzania
Since 1985, Tanzania has liberalized its market for foreign investment and
promoted a privatization policy. In 1990, the Tanzanian government formally adopted a
national investment policy designed to enhance the “development of. . . Tanzania
through mean~s which contribute toward building a more nationally integrated economy
capable ofproviding steadily improving standards of living for the entire population.”4
The investment policy of Tanzania outlined an eleven-point broad-based strategy
for reaching social and economic goals. This strategy included the maximum utilization
of domestic and regional capacities and resources including natural and surplus labor. It
also emphasized an increase in externa.l resource inflows through export-oriented
activities and the transfer ofappropriate technologies that are linked with domestic
economic activities. Furthermore, the policy encouraged non-debt-creating foreign
investments and promoted the distribution of balanced and equitable growth throughout
the country.
The government of Tanzania also granted foreign investors the right to repatriate
100% of their profits in foreign currency and capital. It also permitted the employment of
4The United Republic of Tanzania, National Investment Promotion Policy (Dar es Salaam: The
President’s Office Planning Commission, 1990), 2.
53
five foreign nationals in any project that qualifies for incentives.5 The government
welcomed investment in agriculture, tourism, mining and petroleum development,
manufacturing industries, construction, transport, transit trade, and computer and other
high technologies.
Foreign investors, with local private enterprises or the public sector, have equal
access to all the priority investment areas. The government of Tanzania also attempted to
fosterjoint ventures between local and foreign investors without imposing a
predetermined proportion ofequity holdings. Some areas, however, were reserved for
public investment and for Tanzanian nationals. The areas reserved for public investment
included steel production, machine tool manufacturing, chemical fertilizers and
pesticides, airlines, the making and distribution ofarms and explosives, electricity, public
water, railways, postal and telecommunication, radio and television broadcasting, and
banks and insurance. Some of these sectors were exclusively reserved for public
investment because they were associated with national security issues. For example, iron
and steel production, chemical fertilizers and pesticides, the making and distribution of
arms and explosives, and electricity and public water generation and distribution were
reserved for public investment, primarily because they have a dual purpose: economic
and military security.
Tanzanian nationals were encouraged to invest in retail or wholesale trade,
operation of taxis, butcheries, and barber shops. Since the government of Tanzania
aimed to increase the inflow of foreign technology and capital into the economy, foreign
investments were discouraged in the areas mentioned here as transfer of capital and
technology were unlikely to take place. A minimum requirement of $250,000 was
5See, The United Republic of Tanzania, Procedure for Obtaining TIC Certificate of Incentives
(Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Investment Centre, 1997).
54
imposed to discourage foreign private investments in the areas indicated above. This
minimum requirement discouraged foreign investors because the potential for profits was
unattractive. Imposing a minimum requirement may also have been a strategy to protect
the interests of Tanzanian nationals as many of them were engaged in the aforementioned
economic activities. The Tanzanian govermnent was also particularly concerned with
ensuring the acquisition of land in the hands of its citizens.
Under a discrete section, the investment policy stated:
village land is not available for commercial activities, except by the
village itself.. . . Village land may be sub-leased by the village for small
or medium scale, private or public, economic activities. It should be
emphasized that there are extensive areas of arable land, outside
designated village land, which are still available for lease by private or
public investors.6
Furthermore, the government has adapted a legal framework and joined the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency to protect private properties owned by local or foreign investors. In addition to
these legal and policy frameworks that protect the interests of local and foreign investors
and secure their property rights, both ofwhich were systems of inducing investment
inflows, the government of Tanzania provided handsome financial incentives for
investments in selected sectors of the economy.
Provided that private investments take place in priority sectors, investors receive
tax holidays for the first five years of their operations. Thereafter, a fifty percent tax was
to be applied on profits earned by non-residents and forty percent on residents.
Furthermore, iffespective of the proportion of the equity holding, if local or foreign
investors established a joint venture with the Cooperative Societies, investors will enjoy
the same tax holiday and a 22.5 percent tax rate applied thereafter. Lower tax rates for
6The United Republic ofTanzania, National investment Promotion Policy, 6.
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joint investment with the public or domestic private sectors and a significantly lower tax
rate (22.5%) for joint investment with the Cooperative Societies were viewed as an
effective approach to encourage the transfer of entrepreneurial skills and technology. Put
differently, foreign investors and the Cooperative Societies enjoy special privileges and
tax incentives.
Protection under the investment act was automatically granted when investors
submit an application for certificate of incentives, contingent upon the approval of the
project. The certificate of incentives was non-transferable and would be voided if the
holder of the “certificate does not commence operations within the first two years of
issuance of a certificate without satisfactory reasons.”7 The tax policy, also, had another
important purpose in the Tanzanian economy. Through deductions and concessions, the
tax policy was hoped to bind the various sectors of the economy by encouraging forward
and backward linkages of factor inputs. For example, for imported items that were of
interest to the expansion and development of the priority sectors, the government
provided tax concessions either for customs duty-free imports or the refund of taxes
including those on domestic sales.
B. Investment Policy of Ethiopia
The military government ofEthiopia gradually abandoned its central planning
economic policy and opened the economy for foreign private investment with the hope to
engender economic development After a negotiated removal ofMengislu Haile-Mariam
from power, the transitional government formally adopted an investment policy to speed
up the economic and social development ofthe country. This policy was designed to
7The United Republic of Tanzania, Tanzania Investment Act. 1997, Acts Supplement No. 26,
(Dar es Saiaam: The Government Printer, 3rd October 1997), 445.
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increase the supply of goods and services and advance the interests of domestic
consumers and foreign investors.
The 1992 Investment Proclamation stated that the primary objective of the
investment policy was to accelerate the production ofquality goods and services for the
domestic market and reduce the unemployment rate. It was also to foster export-led
economic growth. These objectives were to be achieved by promoting the transfer of
know-how, technology, and technical skills.8 In this endeavor for social and economic
reconstruction of the country, the investment policy emboldened foreign investors to play
“proper” roles through joint investments in the priority sectors which included large scale
engineering and metallurgy, mining and energy sectors, and pharmaceutical and fertilizer
plants.9 Other sectors of strategic importance including military and economic (the
defense industries, large scale production of electrical energy, transportation, and
communication sectors) were reserved for public investments.
Although the 1992 investment policy delineated the criterion and procedures for
incentive eligibility and tax exemptions, it did not clearly state the sectors that were open
for private investment. Rather, it outlined the sectors that were reserved for public or
joint investment and left the private sectors to search for investment opportunities in the
economic sectors that were not listed in the investment policy. For example, the 1992
investment policy stated that investments in the social services and mass media were to
be determined by future government policy and law. It also stated that investments in the
news media including radio, television, newspapers, and journal broadcasting services
8The Transitional Government ofEthiopia, “A Proclamation to Provide for the Encouragement,
Expansion and Coordination ofInvestment,” Negarit Gazeta, No. 15/1992, (Addis Ababa: Berhanena
Selam Printing Enterprise, 1992).
9lbid.
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were designated as areas requiring further examination.’0
In 1996, the government of Ethiopia enacted a coherent investment policy which
outlined the sectors that were open for foreign and domestic investors. As the 1996
Investment Proclamation pointed out, “[t]he investment policy of the Federal Democratic
Republic ofEthiopia is designed to improve the living standards ofthe peoples of
Ethiopia through the realization of sustainable economic and social development” The
objectives of the 1992 and 1996 investment policies and the means with which these
goals were to be achieved remained basically unaltered. It sought to achieve “sustainable
economic and social development” by exploiting the natural resources, developing the
domestic market, and increasing foreign exchange earning through an expansion and
diversification ofexport products. It also stated that a foreign investor may hire senior
expatriate experts and managers provided that (upon appropriate announcement)
Ethiopians with comparable qualifications were not available.’2
In the 1996 Investment Proclamation, the areas reserved for government,
domestic, foreign, or joint investments were unambiguously designated. While the
defense industry remained strictly for public investment, other sectors of strategic
importance were open (with some conditions) for private investments. Investments in
production and supply of electric energy with installed capacity of 25 megawatts or more
and air transport services with a capacity of more than 20 passengers or a cargo capacity
of more than 2,700 kg were specifically designated for public investment. Additionally,
all rail transport services, telecommunication, and postal services with the exception of
10Ibid.
11The Federal Democratic Republic ofEthiopia, “Investment Proclamation,” Federal Negarit
Gazeta, No. 37/1996, (Addis Ababa: Bethanena Selam Printing Enterprise, 18 June 1996).
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courier services were reserved for public investment
Domestic investors were encouraged to invest in any other sector given that they
satisfy the minimum capital requirement and remained outside of these restricted
economic sectors. Those sectors that were designated for public investment in the 1992
Proclamation (engineering and metallurgical industries, and pharmaceutical, basic
chemical, petrochemical, and fertilizer industries) were listed among the areas open for
domestic and foreign private sectors joint investment However, as stated in the
investment policy, the equity share of the domestic investor in a joint investment, with a
minimum total capital of $20 million, was not to be less than 27% of the total capital
invested. The minimum requirement for foreign investors remained the same ($500,000)
and the minimum capital required for joint investment with a domestic partner was
$300,000. In a joint investment, the foreign investor may contribute no more than
$2 19,000 to the joint venture.
Relaxing the minimum requirement for joint investment in addition to financial
rewards in the form of incentives was a method of inducing the inflow of foreign private
investment. Additionally, the reduction in the minimum requirement was to encourage
joint venture between foreign and domestic private sectors and create an environment for
the transfer of technologies and know~how. This scheme may also have been an attempt
to promote a level playing field between foreign and domestic private sectors.
The 1996 investment policy ofEthiopia was also designed to retain profits and
capital within the Ethiopian economy. For example, to discourage the outflow of profits
and capital, the government expanded the investment incentive packages to a minimum
capital of $100,000 for investments made in new projects. The provision of incentives
was also used as a means to increase the inflow of foreign financial capital. For example,
foreign investors qualify for incentives if 25% of the total capital entered the economy of
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Ethiopia in the form of cash. In the case of a domestic investor, investment incentive
certificates could be secured upon proofof total capitai investment ofBirr 250,000 which
was approximately $40,000 at the 1992 exchange rate.’3
The investment policy also stipulated that importation of items essential for the
operation of foreign or domestic owned industry would receive up to 15% tax exemption,
provided that those items were not available in the country in comparable quantity,
quality, and price.’4 Private investors were also exempted from income taxes up to a
maximum of three years from the date of commencement of production or operation.
The 15% tax exemption was another method ofpromoting factor input linkages and
exploitation of domestic resources. Furthermore, in line with export-led industrialization
schemes, many ofthe export products were exempted from duties and other taxes.
Comparison of Investment Policies and Investment Inflows
As stated in the investment policies ofEthiopia and Tanzania, the main purpose
of liberalizing their economies was to enhance the social and economic development of
the countries through export oriented development strategies. The Tanzanian investment
policy, in particular, emphasized an increase in non-debt-creating foreign investment and
equitable distribution of growth in both the urban and the rural sectors. The Tanzanian
government’s attempt to ensure equitable distribution of foreign investment between the
rural and urban areas was evident in the provision of greater incentives for joint
investments between foreign or local private investors and the Cooperative Societies.
The Ethiopian investment policy, in contrast, stated that the primary objective of the




market and create employment opportunities. It also stipulated that the primary concern
of the government was to improve the standard of living of the people ofEthiopia The
areas that were reserved for public or domestic private investment and those that were
open for foreign investment in both Tanzania and Ethiopia were similar, except during
the transitional period in Ethiopia. In addition, the investment policies of both countries
did not state a restriction on the repatriation of profits. Both governments also allocated
almost identical incentives and tax holidays to foreign investors. However, the data: in
Table I reveals significant differences in the flow of foreign direct investment between
Tanzania and Ethiopia
_______________________________________ Ethiopia













Source: For Foreign Direct Investment data from 1986 to 1990, see Untied Nations Commission on Trade
And Development, World Investment Report 1992, Transnational Corporations as Engines of
Growth, ST/CTS/130, (New York: United Nations, 1992): 312-213.
For Foreign Direct Investment data from 1991 to 1996, see United Nations Commission on Trade
And Development, World Investment Report 1997, Tansnational Corporations, Market Structure
and Competition Policy (New York: United Nations, 1997), 304. For data on Import, Export, and
Imp/Exp Balance, see United Nations, 1994 International Trade Statistics Yearbook Vol. II (New
York: United Nations, 1995), S 10.
data unavailable.
Table].
Foreign Direct Investment, Import. and Export from 1986-1996.
(Millions ofUS $)
Tanzania
~ FDI Import Export Imp~Exp Balance FDI
1986 .... -8 892 329 -563 -1
1987 .... -1 904 282 -622 -3
1988 .... 4 805 269 -536 2
1989 .... 6 998 364 -634 0
1990 ... . -2 1363 331 -1033 12
1991 .... 3 1553 342 -1211 1
1992 .... 12 1533 423 -1110 -
1993 .... 20 .. .. 1546 455 -1091 -
1994 .... 50 .. .. 1501 520 -981 3
1995.150 * * -- 8....
1996.190 * * -- 5....
Average.. 39 1233 368 -865 3
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For both countries, the ratio of imports to exports was such that imports were
increasing faster than exports. In addition, although Ethiopia and Tanzania offer almost
identical incentives and investment environments, the data reveals that foreign
investment in Tanzania was steadily increasing and in Ethiopia it was fluctuating. From
1986 to 1996, referring to Table 1, the average foreign direct investment in Tanzania was
$39 million, which is substantial when compared with little or no investments during the
countrys transitional phase (from 1986 to 1991) from a central planning to a market
economy. The average imports and exports and the import/export balance were (in
millions ofdollars) $1,233, $368, ~$865, respectively.
Between 1986 and 1991, foreign direct investment in Tanzania was at its lowest
when compared with foreign direct investment from 1992 to 1996. The low level of
imports, exports, and the narrow gap in the ratio of imports to exports seems to be
correlated with the low level of foreign investments. In 1991, Tanzania had the greatest
trade imbalances with a ratio of 5:1. Stated differently, Tanzania imported five times
more than it exported. This wide gap between imports and exports took place with the
improvements in the flow of foreign investment from -$2 million to +$3 million. In 1990
and 1992, Tanzania imported four times more than it exported or, stated differently, the
ratio of imports to exports was 4 to 1.
In 1993 and 1994, the ratio of imports and exports declined to the level of 3 to 1.
The 1993 and 1994 import/export ratios were similar to the ratios of import/export. from
1986 to 1989, when the country was in the process of liberalizing its economy. Notice
that the decline in the ratio of imports to exports occurred during the transitional period
from a central planning to a market economy. In Ethiopia, on the other hand, foreign
direct investment was low and fluctuating throughout the years under consideration..
Foreign investment in Ethiopia amounted to a mere average of $3 million. The average
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imports and exports were $923 million and $322 million, respectively. The average
import/export balance was ~$600 million. Throughout the years under consideration with
the exception of 1991 when the country was in political crisis, the import/export balance
remained within a very small margin away from the average import/export balance of -
$600 million.
The ratio of imports to exports from 1986 to 1989 was approximately 2.5:1. In
1990, however, the economy experienced one of its highest import/export imbalances.
Ethiopia imported four times more than it exported (4:1). In 1991, the import/export
imbalance declined to a ratio of (3:1), only to widen in the subsequent years when the
government implemented an economic liberalization policy.
Notice also that the highest import/export imbalance occurred when the country
received the highest foreign investment which amounted to $12 million. Moreover,
given the low level of foreign investments and imports in Ethiopia, the volume of the
average exports was not far behind the volume of the average exports of Tanzania.
Determinants of Foreign Investment Flows
Although the economies in transition face similar development challenges and
both adopted similar development strategies and provided competitive incentives, the two
countries’ success in maintaining a steady flow of foreign investment and stable political
environment was very different. Political stability has been recognized as one of the
most important factors that determine the direction of foreign direct investment.
Hinder Singh and Kwang W. Jun asserted that political risk significantly
influences the flow of foreign direct investment’5 Examination ofthe record on foreign
15Hainder Singh and Kwang W. Jun, “Some New Evidence on Determinants of Foreign Direct
Investment in Developing Countries,” available from http:IIww.worldbank.orglhtinl/dec/...sfworkpapers/
wpsl53I; Internet.
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direct investment in Tanzania and Ethiopia and in a number of other African countries
may reveal whether or not the fear of political instability is an important factor that
influences the decision of the private sector to invest in other economies. The flow of
foreign investment in Tanzania during the transitional period from a planned economy to
a market economy seems to confirm Singh’s and Jun’s assertion. However, a closer look
at the flow of investment in Ethiopia and Tanzania. and in other African countries
invalidates their assertion.
Tanzania, rich in human and natural resources with a population of approximately
30 million and one of the most politically stable country in sub-Saharan Africa, had
negative balance of foreign direct investment.. In 1986, foreign investment in Tanzania
started out with a negative balance and continued to fluctuate until 1991. This low level
of foreign investment may be attributable to the transitional phase from a command to a
market economy. From 1991 onwards, Tanzania improved its share of foreign direct
investment inflows into its economy.’6 By 1992, it had a total of $12 million, the largest
amount of foreign investment since the transitional period.
On the other hand, the flow of foreign investment in Ethiopia between 1986 and
1989 was fluctuating and low. Like Tanzania, Ethiopia started out with a negative
foreign investment. However, in the midst ofpolitical crisis, foreign direct investment
flows to Ethiopia soared to $12 million, the highest amount since 1986. In 1996, despite
relative political stability, foreign direct investment flow was down by $7 million. In
other words, the highest amount of foreign investment in Ethiopia occurred at a time
when there was political instability.
l6~~ the United Nations Conference on Trade And Development, World Investment Report 1997.
Transnational Corporations. Market Structure and Competition Policy (New York: United Nations, 1997).
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Wben compared with other countries in the region, foreign investments in
Tanzania in 1992 and in Ethiopia in 1990 were insubstantial. For example, Mauritius, a
small island with a population of 1.1 million, had $47 million in 1990, down slightly in
1996. In 1997, Nigeria was the leading recipient of foreign direct investment with a total
of $1.71 billion,17
In 1996, Angola had the highest ($300 million) in foreign direct investment in all
of sub-Saharan Africa In the same year, Ghana and Uganda which are said to be
politically stable and in good standing with the International Monetary Fund received
$120 and $121 million in foreign direct investment, respectively.18
If political stability determined the flow of foreign direct investment, then why
were Nigeria and Angola the leading recipients and not Tanzania? That is to say, if
political risk was significantly correlated with the flow of foreign direct investment, then
Angola and Nigeria would have been the smallest recipients. Furthermore, the rise in
foreign investment ($12 million in 1990) occurred when the political future ofEthiopia
was uncertaiit
Paradoxically, when the government of Ethiopia denounced its central planning
system and implemented a market economic policy, there were little or no investments in
the years between 1992 and 1996. A case by case examination of the data on foreign
investment in Ethiopia and in those other countries does not support the claim that
political stability is the only factor that determines the flow of investment. This suggests
that there may be other explanations for the differences in the flow of foreign investments
between the two countries.
17~Deve1opment: Global Investment Boom Bypasses Africa,” Interpress Service (21 September
]997)~
18The World Bank, 1998 World Development Indicators (New York: Oxford University Press,
1998): 334-35.
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For some scholars, a factor that may be associated with the flow of foreign
investment is the differential rate of return on investment. In other words, the greater the
financial rewards, such as profits and other incentives, the greater the flow of foreign
investments. According to Edward M~ Graham, this correlation does not hold especially
when viewed from the point ofview ofhistorical records.
Graham argued that differential rate of returns from investment does not tell much
about the direction foreign direct investment will flow. He maintained that the record on
the determinants of foreign investment is ambiguous. According to him,
[e]xactly why foreign direct investment flows during the 1980s were so
concentrated in the triad nations is not wholly clear. Rates of return on
foreign direct investment in the triad were not higher than elsewhere;
rather, available evidence suggests they were lower.’9
William Easterly, on the other hand, argued that the record on the determinant of
foreign investment is not ambiguous, and it is not necessarily true to argue that political
risk or business condition determines the flow of foreign direct investment. For Easterly,
it is incentives for higher returns on investment that determines the flow of foreign
investment. According to him, governments, the business community, and people
respond to incentives.20 Easterly’s argument is in congruence with the Tanzanian and
Ethiopian Investment Promotion Acts which highlighted incentives as a way to attract
foreign investment.2’
19Edward M. Graham, Global Corporations and National Governments (Washington: Institute For
International Econontics, 1996), 22.
20William Easterly, “The Quest for Growth, How we wondered the tropics trying to figure out
how to make poor countries rich,” available from http://www.worldbauk.org/html/prdmg/grthweb
notes.htrnl; Internet.
21The United Republic ofTanzania, The Tanzania Investment Act 1997, Acts Supplement No. 26,
(Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 3rd October 1997): 44—451. See also, The Federal Democratic
Republic ofEthiopia, “Investment Proclamations,” Negarit Gazeta (Addis Ababa: Bethanena Selam
Printing Enterprise, 18 June 1992).
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Others maintained that the provision of competitive incentives may not
significantly influence the direction to which foreign direct investment flows. Sheila
Page pointed out that very specific investment policies are the key to attract foreign
investment.22 Pag&s position partly explains the differences in foreign investment
between Ethiopia and Tanzania.
For example, the Tanzanian investment policy did not indicate that foreign
investors have a “proper role” to play in Tanzania’s social and economic development
efforts. Furthermore, the investment policy of Tanzania did not take the hiring of
expatriate conditional on “appropriate” announcements of vacancies. In contrast, the
Ethiopian investment policy placed ambiguous conditions on hiring expatriates.
Additionally, the investment policy ofEthiopia imposed indirect restrictions on
the private sector by failing to delineate the sectors that were open for privatization. The
rate of return for investment and the specificity of the investment policy may be more
important factors that created the differences in the flow of foreign investment between
the two countries than the fear ofpolitical instability in host economies.
Implications of Investment and Development Policies
The effectiveness of the investment and development policies of Tanzania and
Ethiopia manifest in the human developments of each country. Public policies playa far
greater role in the development of the two countries. It serves as an instrument to forge
alliance with domestic and foreign private sectors. The effectiveness of the policy
instruments in forging a partnership with the private sectors and the successful
22Sheila Page, “Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America,” Journal ofLatin American Studies
29 (February 1997): 237 - 238.
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transformation of an economy could be determined by examining the data on the human
development indicators.
In addition, data on employment and the concentration of private investments
could help assess whether the investment policies of the two countries were coherent and
effective. The following four sections are designed to analyze the data on human
development, employment creation, and the concentration of private investments in the
economies of Tanzania and Ethiopia.
A. Comparison of Human Development in Tanzania and Ethiopia
One of the most important differences between Tanzania and Ethiopia was the
human capital stock. The human capital stock is measured in terms ofaccess to safe
water, sanitation, health services, and the percentage of pupils enrolled in secondary
education. The latter has been examined in Chapter II and, thus, the other variables are
the focus of the following section.
Recognizing the importance of the human capital stock as a measure of economic
development and as a significant factor that affects the flow of foreign investment, in
general, and foreign technologies, in particular, the governments ofEthiopia and
Tanzania have formulated development policies to improve the standard of living in their
respective countries. Improvement in the standard of living was not only a moral but
also an economic issue that needed to be addressed as an important component in the
development policies of Tanzania and Ethiopia.
The economic implication of improvements in the standard of living is crucial.
Simply stated, a higher percentage ofpopulation with access to safe water, sanitation, and
health services is a reliable indicator of the flow of foreign investment and the stages of
economic development It is, therefore, important to analyze these variables (see Table
2) with specific reference to their economic implications.
Table 2.
Human Development Indicators
Life Rural Rural Population Population
Population Expectancy at Population with access to with access to
(millions) Birth ~yeara) (as % oftotal) SW(%) SN (%) HS(%) SW(%) SN(%) HS(%)
Countr~’ 1980 1995 1987 1995 1990 1995 1990 1990 1990 1996 1996 1996
Tanzania.. 19 ... 30 ... 54... 51.... 67*... 76.... 46 77 72.... 38 86 42
Ethiopia .. 30 ... 56 ... 42... 49.... 87 ... 85.... 11 7 25 19 46
Source: United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1992 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992), 134 147; See also, United Nations Development Programme, Human
Development Report 1998 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 165. Data for 1990 is an
average of data from 19874990; and for 1996 it is an average of data from 1990-96.
*The 1992 Human Development Report shows that the rural population was 67 percent in 1990 and the
1998 report by the same agency shows that the urban population in 1995 was 24 percent. The
percentage of the rural population in Tanzania in 1995 has increased by 9 percent. This indicates
that either the data is incorrect or urbanization is declining (which is very unlikely).
The United Nations Development Programme Report on population growth in
Tanzania and Ethiopia reveals that the population there almost doubled in fifteen years
(see Table 2). Tn 1980, the population of Tanzama and Ethiopia was 19 and 30 million,
respectively. By 1995, the population of Tanzania increased by 11 million while the
population ofEthiopia grew by 26 million. Life expectancy in Tanzania declined by
three years while in Ethiopia it showed a remarkable improvement, from a mere 42 years
in 1987 to 49 years in 1995. Although it is not unique to Tanzania and Ethiopia, it is
important to note that the majority of the people in both countries live in the rural areas.
A broad-based development strategy, anchored in agriculture or in other priority sectors,
would therefore have to take into account the demographics of these countries. In
general, a high percentage of the rural population in Tanzania seemed to have more
access to safe water, sanitation, and health service than the rural population in Ethiopia.
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Assuming the increase in the percentage of the rural population in Tanzania (from
67% to 76%) is correct and noting that the majority of the rural population in 1990 had
access to sanitation and health services, it can be argued that the majority of the urban
population also had access to sanitation and health services. This is because of the
obvious reason that the urban population has better access to the communication systems
than the rural population. While the data on the percentage of people with access to
sanitation in 1990 and 1996 supports the inference made above, the decline in the
percentage of the total population with access to safe water and health services in 1996
may be a result of reduction in public expenditure for those services. Like Tanzania, the
population ofEthiopia almost doubled from 30 million in 1980 to 56 million in 1995. In
contrast, the rural population in Ethiopia, in 1990, had significantly limited access to safe
water and sanitation. Eighty-five percent of the people in 1995 lived in the rural areas
with no access to health services and a limited access to safe water and sanitation.
Given the percentage ofpopulation in the rural areas, in 1990, ha.d limited access
to these services, then the 1996 data may be a reliable measurement of the urban
population access to safe water, sanitation, and health services. In this regard, human
development in Ethiopia is at its rudimentary stage. In addition, if curative (which is
usually the case in many developing countries) rather than preventive health services is
provided, then the high percentage ofaccess to health services (46%) will be off-set by
the low percentage ofaccess to safe water (25%) and sanitation (19%).
The same may not be true with regard to the provision of these services for the
people of Tanzani& This is mainly because the rural population in Tanzania, in 1990,
had the highest percentage with access to safe water, sanitation, and health services. For
example, in 1995, fifteen percent of the population, which was about 8.4 million people,
lived in the urban areas. In other words, approximately 25%, 20%, and 50% of the rural
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population had access to safe-water, sanitation, and health services, respectively. The
human development indicators also show that at most 1% of the population had access to
safe water, sanitation, and health services. Note also, in 1996, there was a significant
difference in access to sanitation between the people of Tanzania and Ethiopia (86 and 19
percent of the population with access to sanitation in Tanzania and Ethiopia,
respectively).
If one of the factors determining the delivery of services to the rural communities
was the communication system, then Tanzania has made progress toward achieving its
broad-based development goals. This is true because mobilization of resources for
investment in human capital development necessarily presupposes investment in
infrastructure. The more reliable and integrated the communication system, the easier it
is for the governments to reach their citizens and deliver the necessary services to
improve the standard of living. Additionally, the expansion and integration ofmain and
feeder roads reduce the cost of production as resources would be mobilized in a more
timely and efficient manner. A dependable communication system is beneficial for the
two countries and the private sectors. It can be viewed as an incentive similar to the
reduction in tariffs and export duties, because a reliable transport system reduces the cost
of production.
The government ofEthiopia recognizes the importance of the transportation
system, especially roads, in integrating the rural population with the urban and global
economy. According to the government ofEthiopia, the country’s “current road network
of 23,812 kilometers translates into one of the lowest road densities in Africa, ... 75
percent of farms are more than half a days walk from the nearest all-weather road.”23 It
23The Federal Government ofEthiopia, 11Ethiopia -- Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility:
Medium-Term Economic and Financial Policy Framework Paper, 1998/99-2000/01,” available from
http://www. imforg/external/np/pfj,/eth/etp.htm; accessed 10 November 1999; Internet, 14.
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may, perhaps, be for this reason that the people ofEthiopia had limited access to these
crucial services. If the dependability and integration of the communication systems are
reliable measurements of the delivery of services and production costs, then reserving the
communication sector for public investment may not be an effective strategy for social
and economic development
B. Investment and Employment Creation in Ethiopia
Although data for 1995196 was not available, what is presented in Table 3 may be
sufficient to examine a number ofpolicy-relevant issues including allocation of resources
for training and evaluation of investment and employment policies.
Table 3.
Unemployment and Vacancies
by Occupational Classification, 1990-1994 (In number of persons)
1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94
Registered Reported Registered Reported Registered Reported Registered Reported
unenip. vacancies unemp. vacancies unemo. vacancies unemp. vacancies
Professional, lechnical,
andxvlatedworkers,, 576 142 1,122 155 1,470 151 1,307 190
Administrators and
managers 31 23 145 57 123 98 87 54
Cleri~a1 workers 31,632 1,206 35,474 480 38,567 655 44,455 492
Salesworkers 14 50 17 3 254 14 217 10
Service workers 572 1,520 2,210 577 688 561 1,244 454
Agricultural workers 605 43 510 14 604 11 1,451 43
Production and related
workers: Sjcjj1e~j 3,733 1,620 7,647 1,163 4,098 589 2,564 401
Laborers 7,150 3,920 23,737 3,386 17,157 527 13,357 495
Total 44.313 8.524 70.862 5.835 62.941 2.606 64.682 2.139
Source: International Monetary Fund, Ethiopia -- Selected Issues. IMF Staff Country Report, No. 96/52
(Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1996). 38.
Beginning with the most obvious, total registered unemployment in 1990/91 was the
lowest when compared with the record in 1991/92, 1992/93, and 1993/94. Furthermore,
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the largest number of people that were registered as unemployed, in 1990/9 1, were in the
area of clerical works followed by unskilled laborers in the area of “production.”
From 1990 to 1994, reported vacancies in professional, technical, administration
and management, clerical and service works, and agriculture either fluctuated or declined
by a narrow margin. If the number of people registered as unemployed was lower in the
subsequent year than in the previous year (as in the case of skilled workers), then it
would seem reasonable to expect a decline in the number ofvacancies created, unless
those firms were no longer operating. The data seems to indicate that there was an
asymmetrical relationship between “registered unemployed” and “reported vacancies.”
What can be drawn from this discrepancy is that those registered unemployed
were not qualified for the same occupation they were trained for. In addition, as long as
there were vacancies in any of the occupations and so far as training and education were
harnessed with the employment opportunities, the total number of unemployed persons in
their respective professions would have declined. In other words, if economic
liberalization opens employment opportunities, then the number of people registered
unemployed in 1990191 should have been much less than the number of people registered
unemployed in the subsequent years.
In particular, consider the data on “registered unemployed” and reported
vacancies in production and related occupation (second last row in Table 3). In skilled
labor occupation, the lowest reported vacancy was in 1993/94. In the same year,
applicants that were classified as “skilled” had only a 15.6 percent chance of getting
employment in their profession. However, in 1990/9 1, applicants in that same category
had a fifty percent chance of getting employment in their profession. This is also true for
those that were classified as “laborers” in 1990/9 1. According to the 1993/94 report, a
laborer had approximately a 27 percent chance ofbeing hired in that occupational
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category. Furthermore, it is very important to note the changes in the total number of
“registered unemployed” and ‘registered vacancies’ from 1990 to 1994. In 1990/9 1, when
Ethiopia was experiencing political instability, there were 44,313 unemployed persons
and the reported vacancies were 8,524. Beginning in 199 1/92, the number of people that
were registered as unemployed increased by about 60%. This increase in unemployment
was consistent throughout the subsequent two years. “Registered vacancies” also
declined dramatically from 8,524 in 1990/9 1 to 2,139 in 1993/94.
C. Private Investment and Employment Creation in Ethiopia and Tanzania
Since employment creat on is the other most important objective of the two
countries, it is important to consider the data in Table 4.
Table 4.
Private Investment That Have Started Production/Services In Ethiopia
July 1992-April 1998
Number of In’vestment Capilal Employee! Capita]!
Sector Projects (US $) Employee Project Employee
Agneultuse 401 232,111,230 7,265 18.0 31,949.24
Fishing 2 454,923 427 213.5 1,065.39
MiningandQuarrying 5 29,294,308 99 19.8 295,902.10
Manttibcturing 238 161,228,620 7,832 30.4 20,585.88
Construction 27 195,290,620 7,495 277.6 26,056.12
Real estate 8 2,994,769 77 9.6 33,893.10
Wholesale/retailtrade 14 4,637,385 394 28.1 11,770.01
Note] and touti’im 41 9,128,769 428 10.4 21,328.89
Transport 7 142,833,380 5,226 746.6 27,331.30
Banking and Insurance 9 35,935,385 234 26.0 153,570.02
Health 5 427,600 231 46.2 1,851.08
Education 3 964,462 96 32.0 10,046.48
Otherbusiness 6 2,195,539 2,236 372.7 981.91
Total 811 817,496,990 32.040 - - - - - -
Source: Ethiopian Investment Authority, “Summary of Projects which have started Production/Service
from July 1992- April 8, 1998,” (Addis Ababa: Ethiopian Investment Authority, 1998).
* Investment Capital in the original document was given in Ethiopian Birr. The investment capital in this
data is converted to U.S dollar based on the 1998 average exchange rate of $1 :Birr 6.5.
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In Ethiopia, from 1992 to 1998, referring to Table 4, ninety percent of the
projects were in the agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism sectors. In terms of
employment creation, the three sectors accounted for about 49% of the total employment
created between 1992 and 1998. The manufacturing sector which was traditionally labor-
intensive and, therefore, most appropriate for Tanzania and Ethiopia, was neither capital
nor labor-intensive as it is apparent in Table 4. The capital to labor ratio of the
manufacturing sector was $20,585 per an employee and ranked seventh among the twelve
sectors listed in the Table, excluding the banking and insurance sectors. The mining and
quarrying sector was the most capital-intensive with a capital to employment ratio of
$295,902.10 per an employee.
Health and education, two of the most important sectors that determine the
transfer of technology as well as contribute to economic development, have not attracted
significant foreign investments. In particular, the health sector with a total capital of
$427,600 employed 234 persons. The gap in the capital to employment ratio was also
narrow when compared with the other sectors excluding fishing and “other businesses.”
Out of the 811 foreign private investments, there were only three projects in education
and five in the health sectors. The narrow gap in the capital to employment ratio and the
small number of projects in the health and education sectors suggest that foreign
investments were concentrated in capital-intensive industries and there were little
opportunities for the transfer of technologies.
The agricultural sector has traditionally been perceived as labor-intensive and, as
a result, policy-makers and scholars assert that Mrica’s comparative advantage lies in the
production of agricultural commodities. The data on private investments in the
agricultural sector in Ethiopia, however, suggests that the agricultural sector was not
labor-intensive. The agricultural sector constituted about 50% of the total number of
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projects and ranked third in capital-intensity, followed by the transport and construction
sectors (excluding the banking and insurance sectors). It is important to note, also, that
the number of projects in the transportation sector was distressingly low.
In Tanzania (see Table 5 below), almost 75% of the total investments were
concentrated in three sectors (manufacturing, tourism, and agriculture). More than 35%
of the total projects were joint ventures, and 69% of the joint ventures were in the
manufacturing, tourism, and agriculture sectors. In particular, private investments in
Tanzania were largely in the manufacturing sector.
Table 5.
Summary of Approved Local and Foreign Projects In Tanzania
(September 1990 - March 1998)
Total Joint Capital* Employ- Employee! Capital!
Sector Projects Local Foreign Venture (Millions US$~ ment Project Emnloyee
Manuthetuxing... 523 285 83 155 1,356 84,380 161.3 16,070.16
Conatniction .... 43 22 9 12 1,474 3,683 85.7 400,217.21
Petroleum &
Mining 38 11 5 22 310 4,534 119.3 68,372.30
Natural Resources 68 27 14 27 448 21,943 322.7 20,416.53
Touricm 152 67 25 60 310 15,199 100.0 20,396.08
Services 35 15 8 12 92 5,529 158.0 16,639.54
Computer 2 - - 1 1 0.4 20 10.0 20,000.00
Financial 16 2 7 7 493 819 51.2 601,953.60
Teleconnrs 6 1 1 4 28 394 65.7 71,065.99
Agn., & Lirestock
Deve1opu~ent 85 22 19 44 116 27,089 318.7 4,282.18
Transport 56 19 8 29 84 4,894 87.4 17,163.87
Energy 1 -- -- 1 147 90 90.0 1,633,333.33
Total 1.025 471 180 374 4,858.4 168.574 - - - - - -
Source: Tanzania Investment Centre, “Summary ofApproved Projects Between September 1999 - March 1998~
(Dat- es Salaam: Tanzania Investment Promotion Centre, 1998).
~ Investment Capital in the original document is given in Tanzanian Shillings which is converted to U.S
dollar based on the 1998 average exchange rate of $1 :Tsh. 664.
This sector constituted approximately 50% of the total projects, with a narrow gap in
capital to employment ratio of $16,070 per an employee. It ranked tenth in capital-
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intensity categorization, excluding the financial sector. Put differently, the
manufacturing sector in Tanzania was not capital-intensive as it was the case in Ethiopia
While the majority of private investments in Ethiopia were in the agricultural
sector, in the case of Tanzania this sector only constituted 0.08% of the total private
investments. Moreover, unlike the agricultural sector in Ethiopia, the agriculture and
livestock development projects in Tanzania were labor~intensive with a ratio of $4,282
per an employee. The computer, telecommunication, and services sectors were the most
directly related with technology transfer. Investments in these sectors accounted for a
combined percentage of less than one percent of the total projects. In the
telecommunication sector, 75% of the projects were joint ventures and the capital to
employment ratio was not as narrow as the computer and service sectors. The fact that
the majority of the projects in the telecommunication sectors were joint ventures may be
good indicators of the possibilities of technology transfer in Tanzania. However, the
number of projects where technology transfer would have taken place were very few.
The energy and transport sectors play an important role in linking the other
sectors. However, investments in these economically and strategically important sectors
were significantly low. There was only one project in the energy sector and fifty-six
projects in the transport sector. This low level of investment in the two sectors may be a
result of the financial capacity of the governments. Although the strategic importance of
the energy and transport sectors is vital for the economic securities of both countries, it is
also crucial to realize that underdeveloped infrastructure and energy could negatively
impact the productivity of the other sectors.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
This research attempted to explore some of the challenges facing post-Socialist
Tanzania and Ethiopia and the opportunities available for them to transform their
economies. Ethiopia and Tanzania shifted their development policies from a command
economic system to a free-market economy to correct some ofthe main weaknesses of
the previous development strategy that undermined domestic capital formation and
indigenous technological advancements. The shift in development models also brought
about the need to redefine the role of the state, and the recognition of the private sector as
a propellant of economic development The importance of the private sector in the
economic transformation of the two countries is evident in the investment policies of
Tanzania and Ethiopia.
The development models pursued by Tanzania and Ethiopia in the Cold War
period were essentially designed to mobilize resources in an efficient and coherent
manner and to deliver public goods and services on the bases of equity. In this regard,
central planning system sought to correct inequalities that were inherited from
colonialism, in the case of Tanzania, and from the feudal monarchy, in the case of
Ethiopia. The human and technical capacities, necessary for the mobilization of
resources and delivery ofpublic goods, were not fully developed. Consequently, it was
essential for the public sector to engage in the production and distribution of economic
resources. In so doing, however, it undermined the very foundations of indigenous
development -- the domestic private sector. The development policies that were
designed to promote the rise of the domestic private sectors through subsidies, tariff,
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and quotas did not permit them to experiment with new techniques and devices.
In addition, because industrialization was perceived as a measure of advancement,
many countries in Africa disproportionately allocated scarce resources to the industrial
sector. Central planning development schemes failed to cultivate linkages among the
various sectors ofthe economies. Because the industrial sector was perceived as the
spring-board upon which the economies of Tanzania and Ethiopia leap-frog from
underdevelopment to development, other segments of the economies including the
agricultural and communication systems remained in the shadow ofthe leading sector.
Ujamma and Sefera, which emphasized agriculture-based development, were the flip
sides of the industrialization schemes. Irrespective of the shifts in allocation of resources,
the urban and, latter, the rural-based development approaches resulted in low domestic
savings and investments and decelerated economic growth.
Given the experiences ofTanzania and Ethiopia and many other African
countries, some scholars and policy-makers remain convinced that African countries have
comparative advantage in the production ofagricultural commodities. Their conviction is
grounded on the assumption that the technological advancements made in other regions
suit the development needs ofthe poor countries in Africa. It also rests on the financial
and institutional capacities ofAfrican states to implement policies that would ensure a
level playing field among competing economic agents.
Compared with their primary trading partners, the Western nations, many African
countries lack the techniques to increase productivity, reduce cost, and allocate
competitive subsidies to their farmers. Similarly, with institutional, technological, and
financial constraints, it is highly unlikely that Tanzania and Ethiopia regulate and manage
their economies as effectively as the industrialized nations, making them vulnerable to
external pressure and less competitive in a free-market economic environment.
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In addition, to say that the two countries have comparative advantage in the
production of agricultural commodities and that resources need to be allocated to that
sector is to argue for a piecemeal development strategy. This assertion by some policy-
makers and scholars serves little puipose to address the development challenges of
Ethiopia and Tanzania. Therefore, for any development policy that seeks to reflect the
unique circumstances of these countries, it must necessarily be pragmatically broad-based
and not necessarily anchored in the agricultural sector.
The United States Department of Justice intervention to restrain monopolistic
practices by Microsoft Corporation and others has important implications on the role of
the state in Tanzania and Ethiopia. It is, therefore, important to note that even exponents
of free-market economy make the effort to protect their “infant industries.” If invention
and innovation are to be sustained, then the state needs to ‘act like a lion’ to promote
competition, undermine conflict, and create a level playing field among competing
private sectors.
However, the regulatory instruments of the economies in transition do not allow
them to dismantle monopolistic practices by giant (domestic or foreign) corporations. In
other words, a state with institutional, financial, and human capacities is more likely to
formulate and implement prudent development policies and provide a favorable
investment environment than a state mired with unpredictable investment and
development policy. The relevant question, then, is should the role of the state need to be
redefmed by what it does rather than by its capacity to protect the interests of its citizens
and strengthen its domestic private sectors?
Throughout the Cold War era, the economic power ofAfrican countries was weak
and, as a result, there was a need to compensate for this weakness by aligning with
powerful nations elsewhere. African countries’ alignment with the capitalist or socialist
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nations had a political ideology overtone. In the new international economic order,
however, political ideology as a defining element for alignment has become a wasteful
strategy to achieve economic goals. Economic power is diffused among many advanced
and newly industrializing countries.
Given that African governments realize the spread of economic power among
advanced and industrializing nations, there exist greater opportunities for Africans to reap
the benefits of globalization and strengthen their economic muscle. Among these
benefits that may be reaped, contingent on the formulation and implementation of
effective investment policies, are Western technologies and physical capital.
In general, there could be little doubt on the contribution of technology and
capital to accelerate economic growth. In particular, however, the origins and purposes
of these essential elements are important considerations to conclude whether or not they
contribute to economic growth and development in Tanzania and Ethiopia. First, it
would not be incorrect to suggest that in international trade and investment, one of the
most important strategies to accelerate economic growth is to maximize efficiency in
utilizing domestic resources. Second, efficient utilization of resources includes factors of
production that are domestic as well as foreign in origin. Finally, to maximize the
benefits from foreign capital and technology, the governments of Tanzania and Ethiopia
need to provide reliable infrastructure that would also enable producers and consumers to
meet each othe?s interests.
However, foreign capital and technology, in and of themselves, are useless unless
they are augmented by domestic resources such as labor and natural resources. In other
words, foreign capital and technology are necessary but not sufficient conditions to
transform the economies of Tanzania and Ethiopi& There are incompatibilities between
domestic and foreign technologies that, according to Solow and others, require at least
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three sets of structural reforms and building of the human capital stock to absorb foreign
technology. These structural reforms include the single, the new, and the cross-track
models of technology transfer which impose, to varying degrees, a financial burden on
the host nations.
In addition, the human capital stock in Ethiopia and Tanzania is significantly low
and, in order to enhance the inflow of foreign technology and capital, public resources
must be allocated to increase the human capital stock. If such policies are implemented
with the primary purpose ofabsorbing foreign technology, then allocating public
resources to build the human capital stock become no less distorted than the previous
development strategies pursued by Tanzania and Ethiopia.
Moreover, there seems to be little interest among the private sectors to invest in
the sectors such as education, health, telecommunication, and computers in which
technology transfer may have taken place. Therefore, the conditions under which foreign
capital and technology enhance the development goals ofEthiopia and Tanzania depend
on whether foreign capital and technology are modified to suit the development needs of
both countries, coupled with increases in the human capital stock.
Furthermore, as the data in Table 3 indicates, employment opportunities were not
available in most of the sectors discussed there. In fact, the number of people registered
as unemployed increased from 44,313 in 1990/91 to 64,682 in 1993/94. Therefore, it
could be argued that the relationship between the flow of foreign investment and
employment creation was not strong.
In addition to creating employment opportunities, the opening up ofEthiopia’s
and Tanzania’s economies was to enhance their access to foreign market outlets. The
data in Table 1 suggests that the volume ofexports and imports from and to Tanzania has
increased. The same was also true in the case ofEthiopia. However, the importlexport
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balance continued to widen as foreign investment inflow increased. This suggests that
both countries may have improved their access to foreign market outlets at the expense of
debt-creating investments. Furthermore, the increases in imports of goods and services
by Tanzania and Ethiopia indicate that market outlets were incentives for foreign
investors, but it does not suggest that market size and national policies were important
considerations that alone determine the flow of foreign direct investment.
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